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Local authorities in England have responsibility for securing adult social care for their local 
populations. Historically, social care support has included services such as home care, residential 
care, personal budgets and direct payments, equipment, as well as some professional support such 
as social work.  
Social care funding is allocated to local authorities using a formula to help account for differences in 
local funding requirements. The principle behind these formulae is that each local authority should 
have, after their financial allocation, sufficient money so that they can provide an appropriate level 
of services and support to any person in their local populations who is eligible for publicly-funded 
services. This means, for example, that in two local authorities with the same total population but 
with different numbers of people in need, the one with more people in need would get more 
funding. 
Broadly, social care eligibility is dependent on recipients meeting all three of: (i) a sufficient level of 
impairment according to national eligibility criteria; (ii) insufficient informal care support; and (iii) 
limited income/wealth so that they meet the means test. Social care need therefore reflects all of 
these factors. Differences in this social care need between local authorities are incorporated into the 
Local Government Finance Settlement by using formulae. Some additional grants are also distributed 
between local authorities via the same formulae. 
These formulae used to allocate funding to local authorities are (currently) called the Adult Social 
Care Relative Needs Formulae (ASC RNF). Although the exact form of these allocation formulae has 
varied somewhat over the years, the basic principle has been the same. They are periodically 
updated to account for changes in the mix of services local authorities provide to their residents with 
care needs, and also to reflect improvements in data collection and statistical methods which are 
used to estimate RNFs. This revision aims to improve the modelling of the social care needs 
distribution between local authorities by: 
 using data at much smaller area level, i.e. Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA), compared 
to ward level in the 2005/06 analysis; 
 using a much higher number of observations, i.e. more than 13,000 compared to 775 in 
2005/06; 
 using newer data, e.g. Census 2011 and DWP 2013 compared to the Census 2001 data used 
for developing of the current (2005/06) ASC RNF; 
 using additional variables to capture need by taking advantage of the Census 2011, i.e. the 
share of people with limiting (significant) conditions; 
 using additional variables to capture the distribution of wealth, i.e. interaction terms 
between the share of home ownership and the share of properties in various council tax 
bands. 
Recent (planned) reforms of Government policy (as laid out in the Care Act 2014) mean that local 
authorities will take on two new responsibilities regarding social care. These reforms are to the 
financial eligibility rules that govern who is entitled to publicly-funded social care. They are the cap 
on lifetime care costs and the new extended financial means test. Because they are new 
responsibilities, they each need additional allocation formulae. 
Under the current (pre-reform) rules, people with savings and assets worth more than £23,250 – an 
amount called the upper capital limit – generally do not qualify for means tested financial support 
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for their care. Where a person is living alone, the definition of assets for this rule also includes the 
property in which they live, if owned. People who do not qualify – called self-funders – must pay for 
care themselves (although there are some benefits that they can claim to help) and these costs can 
be significant, e.g. more than £36,000 per year in a care home.  
Where people qualify for some publicly-funded support under the current financial means test by 
virtue of having assets of less than the upper capital limit (i.e. £23,250), they may still have to cover 
part of the costs themselves, with the local authority meeting the difference. These charging rules 
are complex, with the amount people have to pay dependent on their income and the amount of 
their assets above £14,250 (i.e. the lower capital limit). Assets under £14,250 are not considered for 
charging purposes. 
In order to help self-funders limit what can be high care costs over their lifetime, a key reform of the 
Care Act 2014 was for self-funders to receive a publicly-funded contribution from their local 
authority to cover their eligible care costs once these exceed a running total of £72,000. 
As a part of the reform package, the upper capital limit of the means test was proposed to increase 
to £118,000 if a person receives care in a care home and all their assets are taken into account in 
their financial assessment. However, if a person is receiving care in any other setting (e.g. home care 
in their own home) or if a person is receiving care in a care home but their home is disregarded in 
the financial assessment, then the upper capital limit would be £27,000. The lower capital limit of 
the means test was also recommended to increase, from £14,250 to £17,000. 
As a result of these reforms, local authorities will need to provide both higher levels of support to 
currently eligible people (i.e. due to the increase of the lower capital limit) and support to newly 
eligible people (i.e. both due to the cap on lifetime care costs and the increase of the upper capital 
limit). The allocation of the new funds to support LAs in meeting these new responsibilities will need 
to fairly reflect the new burden on the LA’s budget. Some local authorities will be affected more 
than others by the new policies (i.e. on one hand those with more self-funders in residential care 
and on the other those with more people of low to middling wealth).  
Aims 
The aim of this work is to develop needs-based formulae that will determine funding allocations to 
local authorities to cover:  
(a) the funding of existing responsibilities of local authorities for adult social care;  
(b) the additional expenditure requirements as a result of the cap on lifetime care costs; and  
(c) the additional expenditure requirements as a result of the extension of the means test.  
Methods 
There are broadly two alternative approaches to determining resource allocation formulae: the 
utilisation-based approach, and the normative (or epidemiological) approach. An essential difference 
in the approaches concerns how the concept of ‘need’ is defined and determined. In social care, 
people are helped by the public (local authority) system because they have issues with personal 
(physical or mental) impairment, suffer risks to safety (which include environmental factors) and lack 
sufficient informal care. As noted, there are also financial-means-testing rules that determine a 
person’s eligibility. In other words, these factors give rise to a ‘need’ for publicly-funded care 
services and support. Local authorities assess people’s need and determine the amount of public 
funding needed to pay for their care. 
The central premise of the utilisation-based approach is that the effect of need is reflected in 
observed patterns of use of services in a local population. This approach does not require definition 
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of some absolute level of need, but rather the relative patterns between individuals. Total need for 
social care in a population will vary according to the needs-related characteristics of that population 
e.g. levels of impairment, environmental factors (such as those that affect people’s safety), the 
availability of family care etc. In theory, there should be a close connection between these 
characteristics and the services actually used. By using suitable indicators of these characteristics, we 
can use statistical models to estimate what drives differences in need.  
In practice, total need is not the only factor that determines what services are actually used. First, 
local authorities can interpret need factors differently. Second, constraints on service capacity or 
supply in a local area will also affect what is actually used. Finally, publicly-funded care services are 
also financially means tested as well as needs-tested. Consequently, we need a set of indicator 
variables that approximates the influence of these factors, as together they give rise to a level of 
publicly-funded social care being used by people with care needs. Statistical techniques (generally 
regression analysis) can be used to isolate the contribution of the different factors. Differences in the 
scale of need effects between local authorities are the basis for a relative needs formula. 
In the normative approach a measure of need in a local population is inferred directly from the 
criteria (ideally best-practice) that local authorities use to define need. For example, we could 
measure the number of people with impairment. The relative scale of this indicator of need between 
local authority populations is then used to generate a relative needs formula. 
These different approaches have their theoretical strengths and weaknesses. However, there are 
practical limitations in using the normative approach in social care. First, no national set of criteria 
exists to define need (specifically enough). Second, there is no basis for how the different elements 
of need (impairment, safety, informal care availability) can be combined into a single indicator of 
relative need. A particular problem is to specify rules for how much need can be met by informal 
care. This issue has proved to be extremely difficult and controversial and, therefore, care systems in 
some countries simply disregard informal care (with the range of policy consequences this brings). 
Third, eligibility for care also depends on people’s financial situation, and these eligibility rules would 
also have to be taken into account.  
Therefore, the pure normative approach was not used in this study. Nonetheless, a conventional 
utilisation-based approach could be used only for the revision of the Relative Needs Formulae. As far 
as the Care Act reforms were concerned, the aim was to estimate formulae for the new eligible 
people. As there are not specific service utilisation data for people not yet receiving these new forms 
of local authority support, a pure utilisation approach was not applicable in these cases.  
Instead, the analysis for the cap on lifetime care costs is based on a mixed-utilisation-based 
approach, which uses data on care home service use by self-funders. People’s service utilisation in 
this case is neither the result of an LA assessment process nor determined by normative criteria but 
rather by self-assessment. Therefore, we had to assume that self-funders in residential care have 
eligible needs according to LA assessment criteria. That may be a reasonable assumption, as care 
home residents (including self-funders) have on average a relative high level of care needs. 
For the extension to the financial means test, we adopted a hybrid approach. It primarily uses 
utilisation data and methods, but predicts the additional expenditure requirement following an 
increase in the upper capital limit on the artificial simulation of the number of additionally eligible 
people based on their financial situation (which is more akin to a normative approach). This 
approach is more practical in this case because the financial-means-test rules are well defined. 
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Empirical analysis and results 
In this analysis we used a small area approach whereby the relationship between per capita 
expenditure (or the count of service users) and per capita need is estimated across small areas of 
our sample LAs. In particular, we used the ONS standard geographical unit of the Lower Layer Super 
Output Area (LSOA) (of which there are 32,844 in England, each with a population of around 1,500 
people). LSOAs boundaries are chosen so that the characteristics of their population do not vary 
much. This allowed us to link in a wide range of potentially relevant need, wealth and supply data. 
We used data on chronic illness, age, sex, household composition, uptake of both income-related 
and disability-related benefits and also indicators of the supply of services in each area.  
As LAs do have powers to directly provide services and are able to manage local markets to some 
extent, we have not considered supply to be externally determined. Therefore, supply effects were 
cleaned by including various indicators of supply in the regression analyses, and then removed by 
setting the corresponding supply variable(s) to a constant for all LAs. Similarly, the effect of LA 
practices on utilisation were estimated and removed by using LA fixed effects (i.e. LA dummy 
variables).  
The Relative Needs Formulae for adult social care 
Four distinct statistical analyses were used to estimate the factors determining service provision: 1) 
care home services for young adults aged 18 to 64; 2) community-based services for young adults 
aged 18 to 64; 3) care home services for older people aged 65 and over; and 4) community-based 
services for older people aged 65 and over. We used LSOA-level data on LA-supported service use 
collected from a sample of around 60 local authorities that agreed to participate in the research. 
The final formula predicting the relative (weekly) cost of (all) social care services for young adults in 
a local authority, expressed in rates per capita 18 to 64, is: 
RNF value (for younger adults) =    
Limiting (significantly) condition 16-64 per capita 16-64 x 22.71 + 
Living arrangements: share of people living in one-family households x -3.82 + 
Population 16-24 per capita 16-64 x -4.40 + 
Income Benefits Claimants 16+ (i.e. IS, ESA, and JSA) per capita 16-59 x 3.77 + 
(Constant)  5.58  
while the final formula for predicting the relative (weekly) cost of social care services for older 
people in a local authority, expressed in rates per capita 65 and over, is: 
RNF value (for older adults) =    
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ x 29.53 + 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ x 27.89 + 
Living arrangements: couple households per household 65+ x -5.35 + 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ x 21.13 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band ABCDE per all properties 
x -5.95 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band FGH per all properties 
x -14.75 + 
(Constant)  14.89  
Sensitivity analysis 
In order to check the robustness of the formulae, we estimated alternative models from which we 
excluded one or more of the need indicator variables not included in the 2005/2006 version of the 
RNF; a further model was estimated by jointly modelling care home and community-based services 
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(as in the previous RNF version). Simulated per capita allocations according to alternative models 
were rather similar, with all coefficients above 0.92 (see Figure 2, p. 32 and Table 20, p. 57).1 
Comparison to 2005/06 RNF 
When using the new and old RNF formulae to calculate per capita funding allocations to local 
authorities, we found a high degree of similarity (a correlation coefficient of 0.91). Due to 
improvements to the empirical analysis (i.e. analysis at much smaller area level, a considerably 
higher number of observations, and additional variables that capture more accurately the 
distribution of need and wealth), the new RNF are expected to better approximate the distribution 
of need between local authorities. 
The cap on lifetime care cost 
The analysis for the cap on lifetime care cost was performed in two stages. The first stage aimed to 
estimate the numbers of self-funders in care homes for each small-area locality in England. These 
numbers are not routinely recorded. Therefore, we conducted a survey of care homes in England to 
find the number of self-funders in a representative sample of care homes and the factors that 
influence this number. 
Using data on care-home characteristics and clients from a sample of 918 care homes in England, we 
modelled the self-funders’ rate using various care home characteristics and socio-economic factors 
at LSOA/MSOA level using regression analysis (see Table 6, p. 34). The estimation results were used 
to predict the share of self-funders for each CQC-registered care home for older people in England. 
By multiplying the predicted share of self-funders in each care home with the registered number of 
care home beds, we obtained an estimate of the count of self-funders at small-area level. We 
obtained an estimated number of self-funders for 8,217 LSOAs (about 25 per cent of LSOAs); the rest 
had no care homes located in them and, therefore, no self-funders in residential care. 
The second stage of the analysis had the aim of establishing a causal relationship between the 
number of self-funders and various factors indicating need, wealth and supply at small area level. 
We opted for an analysis at MSOA level as a strategy to deal with the large number of zero values 
(i.e. compared to only 25 per cent of LSOAs, about 70 per cent of MSOAs had care homes located in 
them). Additionally, we experimented with a range of count and censored data models. 
Local care home capacity (supply) is an important factor in this analysis. Local authorities arguably 
have some control over supply (and can even build care homes if required). If so, the formula should 
not adjust for this factor (as the LA can adjust it). Self-funders do not have this control however. As 
there is some uncertainly as to whether the supply of care home places (to self-funders) is under the 
control of local authorities, we derived two alternative formulae: (1) with a coefficient for supply; 
and (2) with the effect of supply removed.  
The decision regarding which formula to apply should ideally be based on the timing of the LA 
assessment application. If self-funders apply for assessment after moving into a care home – and this 
will be the case for the majority of self-funders applying for assessment during the first year after 
implementation and potentially even in subsequent years – the LA of their care home residence will 
become responsible for them, even if they have moved there from another LA. As the allocation 
formula ought to provide sufficient funding to LAs to support the eligible people with care needs in 
their locality, this argument suggests that supply indicators should be used in the cap formula. 
                                                          
1 A correlation coefficient of 1.00 would indicate identical allocations between models. 
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Accounting for supply does make some difference: the correlation coefficient between per capita 
allocations to LAs according to the two formulae is 0.56. 
We present here the preferred model, i.e. with supply included. The calculation to determine the 
final allocation per capita 65 and over for the cap on lifetime care costs reform in a local authority is 
as follows: 
No. of registered care home beds for old age and dementia per capita 65+ x 0.2655 + 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ x 0.1487 + 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ x 0.0292 + 
Living arrangements: couple households per household 65+ x -0.0224 + 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ x -0.1825 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band ABCDE per all properties x 0.0049 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band FGH per all properties x 0.0248 + 
(Constant)  -0.0005  
The extension to the financial means test 
As there are no utilisation data for newly eligible people under the extended means test, their 
expenditure requirement (i.e. the LA contribution to care costs) needed to be estimated. Moreover, 
individual (or household) income and wealth data are not collected routinely at national level. 
Therefore, we had to simulate financial eligibility and expenditure requirement in a representative 
sample of older people, for which the necessary information was available. These figures were then 
converted at small area level for the whole of England using statistic modelling as follows: 
First, we selected a sample of people with long-standing impairment/disability from the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Using variables about their financial situation, we calculated 
their eligibility and charges for LA care according to both the current and the new means test. 
Second, a statistical analysis was used to estimate for people with care needs the effect of wealth 
(and need) indicator variables on their financial eligibility and expenditure requirements under 
either the current or extended means test (as determined in step one). Sample weights were used to 
ensure that the ELSA sample matched the LSOA data in terms of selected need and wealth 
dimensions (i.e. home ownership, living arrangements, and Pension Credit claimant rates). 
Third, the results of the statistical modelling from step 2 were then applied at small-area level to 
predict the expenditure requirement in each LSOA according to either the current or the new capital 
limits for people that are both financially eligible and satisfy the need test. 
Fourth, we needed also to estimate the proportion of people in each small area who would satisfy 
the needs test for residential care. We did this by using data on the number of people who were 
eligible for LA-funded care home placements in the small area, and then divided through by the 
probability that people in the local population are financially eligible. For example, if 100 people in a 
small area are in LA-funded care homes and on average half of the people with care needs are 
financially eligible, then the total number of people with care needs in the small area is 100/0.5=200. 
We actually used data on new admissions in the analysis, so that recent need factors could be 
applied to the pre-care address and, therefore, avoid problems of out-of-area placements. 
Finally, the calculations from steps 3 and 4 were combined to calculate the expected total additional 
expenditure requirement that would arise from the extended means test for the people in each 
LSOA that would pass both a needs and the (new) extended means test. 
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A regression model at LSOA level was used to estimate an equation for this additional expenditure 
requirement in terms of need, wealth, supply and (population) scaling variables (see Table 13, p. 41). 
The results were then used to determine the allocation formula for the extension to the means test, 
which is:  
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ x 0.4678 + 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ x 0.3238 + 
Living arrangements: couple households per household 65+ x -0.2169 + 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ x 0.2863 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band ABCDE per all properties x 0.0769 + 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band FGH per all properties x -0.0472 + 
(Constant)  0.1844  
The per capita allocations are robust to using alternative unit costs for the simulation of financial 
eligibility and expenditure requirements, as well as alternative wealth indicators. 
Discussion 
Estimation of allocation formulae relies on access to good-quality data. It also requires that we make 
certain assumptions during the analysis in order to produce results, some of which only approximate 
(and simplify) reality. Nonetheless, the results of this study clearly support the principles of need 
adjustment (however that is made). Need levels differ between areas and do impact on the amount 
each local authority will need to provide for care support to meet its obligations. Without allowance 
for these differences, local authorities would have differing financial capacity to meet their care 





1.1 Allocating funding 
Local authorities in England have responsibility for securing adult social care for their local 
populations. Historically, social care support has included services such as home care and residential 
care, personal budgets and direct payments, equipment, as well as some professional support such 
as social work.  
Following the Layfield enquiry in 1976 (Cmnd 6453 1976), social care funding has been allocated to 
local authorities using a formula to help account for differences in local funding requirements 
(Bebbington, Davies 1980a, Bebbington, Davies 1980b). The latest incarnation – in operation since 
2006/7 – is the Relative Needs Formulae (Darton, Forder et al. 2010).  
The fundamental principle underpinning the use of allocation formulae is to ensure equal 
opportunity of access to ‘support’ for equal need. The conventional way to interpret this principle is 
that each council should have, after their allocation, sufficient net funding so that they can provide 
an equivalent level of support (services or otherwise) to all people in their local population who 
would satisfy national standard eligibility conditions (Gravelle, Sutton et al. 2003). For a detailed 
literature review on resource allocation formulae see (Smith 2007). 
Recent (planned) reforms of Government policy (as laid out in the Care Act 2014) mean that local 
authorities will take on two new responsibilities regarding social care. These reforms are to the 
financial eligibility rules that govern who is entitled to publicly-funded social care. They are the cap 
on lifetime care costs and the new extended financial means test. Because they are new 
responsibilities, they each need additional allocation formulae. 
The aim of this work is to develop needs-based formulae that will determine funding allocations to 
local authorities to cover:  
(a) the funding of existing responsibilities of local authorities for adult social care;  
(b) the additional expenditure requirements as a result of the cap on lifetime care costs; and  
(c) the additional expenditure requirements as a result of the extension of the means test.  
Ethical approval for this study was gained from the National Institute of Social Care and Health 
Research Ethics Committee on 29 April 2013. 
1.1.1 Principles 
The objective of the system of Relative Needs Formulae (RNF) is to provide a way of assessing the 
relative need for a particular set of services or support by different local authorities. The formulae 
have to be based on factors that are measured and updated routinely, which have a demonstrable 
and quantifiable link with needs and costs, and are outside the influence of local authorities 
(particularly through past decisions about services). Furthermore, the formulae have to be designed 
to measure variations in needs between local authorities and costs, other than area costs. They are 
not concerned with the absolute level of expenditure needed, or with the short-run implications of 
actual funding arrangements. The current formula contains four components: a need component, a 
low-income adjustment, a sparsity adjustment, and an area cost adjustment.  
Two sets of eligibility conditions/tests are relevant for public social care support in general (Wanless, 
Forder et al. 2006, Forder, Fernandez 2009, Fernandez, Forder 2010, Fernandez, Forder et al. 2011). 
First, the needs test determines whether a person should receive support, and if so how much, given 
their condition (e.g. the level of impairment) and circumstances (e.g. the availability of informal 
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care). Second, the financial means test determines whether a person is eligible for any public 
support on the basis of relevant non-need criteria, particularly the person’s financial circumstances. 
Together these tests determine how much funding is required to meet the national standard. The 
number of people satisfying these tests and the public cost of their support as dictated by the tests 
will vary between local authorities according to the size and nature of both ‘need’ and wealth within 
the local population. These factors can largely be regarded as being ‘exogenous’ beyond the 
(reasonable) control of the local council, and therefore the funding allocations going to local 
authorities should be adjusted to reflect differences in these exogenous factors. Relevant factors will 
include indicators of need such as rates of disability in the local population. These will largely affect 
expenditure requirements through the first test. Furthermore, factors will include markers of asset-
holding and income, which mainly work through the second test. Conventionally, a formula is 
deployed to account for these exogenous factors and adjust each local authority’s funding allocation 
accordingly. 
1.1.2 RNF for adult social care  
The formula for allocating funding to local authorities so that they can meet their (existing) 
responsibilities for adult social care, given differences in the needs of their local populations, is 
(currently) called the Adult Social Care Relative Needs Formulae (ASC RNF). 
Since their introduction, these formulae for adult social care have been revised several times, in 
order to incorporate new and better data and up-to-date methods. This revision aims to improve the 
modelling of the social care needs distribution between local authorities by: 
 using data at much smaller area level, i.e. Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA), compared 
to ward level in the 2005/06 analysis; 
 using a much higher number of observations, i.e. more than 13,000 compared to 775 in 
2005/06; 
 using newer data, e.g. Census 2011 and DWP 2013 compared to the Census 2001 data used 
for developing of the current (2005/06) ASC RNF; 
 using additional variables to capture need by taking advantage of the Census 2011, i.e. the 
share of people with limiting (significant) conditions; 
 using additional variables to capture the distribution of wealth, i.e. interaction terms 
between the share of home ownership and the share of properties in various council tax 
bands. 
1.1.3 Care Act reforms 
Under the current (pre-reform) rules, people with savings and assets worth more than £23,250 (an 
amount called the upper capital limit) generally do not qualify for means-tested financial support for 
their care. Where a person is living alone, the definition of assets for this rule also includes the 
property, if owned, in which they live. People who do not qualify – called self-funders – must pay for 
care themselves (although there are some benefits that they can claim to help) and these costs can 
be significant, e.g. more than £36,000 per year in a care home.  
Where people qualify for some publicly-funded support under the current financial means test by 
virtue of having assets of less than the upper capital limit (i.e. £23,250), they may still have to cover 
part of the costs themselves with the local authority meeting the difference. These charging rules 
are complex, with the amount people have to pay dependent on their income and the amount of 
their assets above £14,250 (i.e. the lower capital limit). Assets under £14,250 are not considered for 
charging purposes.  
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Self-funders can potentially face large costs for care over their lifetime. One in ten people are 
estimated to face paying more than £100,000 over their lifetime, and sometimes people have to sell 
their home to meet these costs (Department of Health 2015). In order to help self-funders, a key 
reform was for them to receive a publicly-funded contribution from their local authority to cover 
their eligible care costs once these exceed a running total of £72,000.  
The cost figure used to calculate the running total towards the cap is the amount that it would cost 
the person’s local authority to meet their needs, if they were eligible for local authority support. It is 
intended to cover only the cost for eligible care services and not the costs of daily living (e.g. 
accommodation and food) or any additional costs (e.g. a bigger room). 
When a person reaches the cap, the local authority will pay a contribution towards their care fees to 
cover the cost of care to meet their needs. This means that a person receiving care in a care home 
will have to pay only a set amount for their daily living costs (i.e. £230 per week) plus any cost for 
upgraded accommodation or extra services (Department of Health 2015). 
Department of Health estimations on the impact of the policy change reveal that after about ten 
years from implementation about 80,000 self-funders will financially benefit from the cap. 
A further reform announced by the Care Act 2014 is a new extended financial means test. Under the 
current rules, only people with assets below £23,250 qualify for means-tested financial support for 
their care. Given the significant increase in property values over recent decades, this means that 
most home owners have to pay the full social care cost themselves. In order to adapt the public 
funded social care system to these new realities, the level at which someone qualifies for means-
tested support was recommended to be raised (Department of Health 2015). 
The upper capital limit of the means test was proposed to increase to £118,000 if a person receives 
care in a care home and all their assets are taken into account in their financial assessment. 
However, if a person is receiving care in any other setting (e.g. home care in their own home) or if a 
person is receiving care in a care home but their home is disregarded in the financial assessment 
(e.g. because their spouse continues to live in the home) then the upper capital limit should be 
£27,000 (see Figure 1 below). The lower capital limit of the means test was also recommended to 
increase from £14,250 to £17,000. 
This reform would mean that wealth of £17,000 or less is fully disregarded for charging purposes; 
wealth between £17,000 and the relevant upper capital limit is considered for charging purposes on 
a sliding scale;2 and people with total wealth above the relevant upper capital limit are expected to 
fully cover their social care cost, until they meet the cap.  
As a result of these reforms, local authorities will need to provide both higher levels of support to 
currently eligible people (i.e. due to the increase of the lower capital limit) and support to newly 
eligible people (i.e. both due to the cap on lifetime care costs and the increase of the upper capital 
limit). The allocation of the new funds to support LAs in meeting these new responsibilities will need 
to fairly reflect the new burden on the LA budgets. Some local authorities (such as those with more 
self-funders in residential care and those with more people of low to middling wealth) will be 
affected more than others by the new policies.  
                                                          
2 ‘Tariff income’ is used to determine what contribution a person is asked to make towards their care costs from their 
capital in addition to a contribution from their income. People who receive local authority support are asked to make a 
contribution of £1 per week for every £250 in assets which fall between the lower limit and relevant upper capital limit. 
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Besides the revision of the current relative needs formulae for the allocation of adult social care 
funding, the aim of this work is therefore to develop needs-based formulae that will determine 
funding allocations to local authorities for the additional expenditure requirements as a result of the 
cap on lifetime care costs and the extension of the means test respectively. 
Figure 1. Application of upper capital limits according to the (new) extended means test 
 
Source: Social Care Local Government and Care Partnerships Directorate Analytical Unit, Department of Health. 
1.2 Methodological approaches 
There are broadly two alternative approaches to determining resource allocation formulae as 
debated in the literature (although almost exclusively referring to the distribution of healthcare 
funding). An essential difference in the approaches concerns how the concept of ‘need’ is defined 
and determined.  
The first is the utilisation-based approach (Gravelle, Sutton et al. 2003, Smith 2007, Darton, Forder et 
al. 2010). The central premise is that the effect of need – and differences in patterns of need 
between individuals – is reflected in observed patterns of utilisation. Put simply, people with high 
levels of need will use more services/support than people with low levels of need. Importantly, this 
approach does not require a definition of some absolute level of need but rather the relative 
patterns between individuals. Statistical techniques (generally regression analysis) can then be used 
to estimate the causal effects of need and other factors on utilisation. After deciding which of the 
factors in the estimation are legitimately beyond the control of the public care system, the size of 
the effect of these factors is used as the basis for a relative needs formula. 
There are three key concepts/assumptions involved with this approach. First, when we think about 
‘need’ – with respect to the underlying principle of resource allocation (equal access for equal need) 
– we are assuming that the needs-related criteria used by care commissioners in their decisions 
about how much care to provide to people (of given assessed need) are in some sense ‘appropriate’. 
In other words, the criteria and professional judgements that commissioners employ must be 
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accepted as defining the concept of need. This assumption might be challenged if some externally-
determined normative standard was available and if current practice was found not to conform to 
this standard. In that case, the utilisation approach would be perpetuating existing practice, i.e. not 
the ‘best’ practice. 
The second assumption is that the other (non-need) influences on final patterns of utilisation can be 
sufficiently accounted for in the analysis. The other main influence is the supply of care services. In 
particular, if current supply has been affected by factors other than need, then observed patterns of 
utilisation will also embody these non-need influences. We would want to identify these non-need 
influences in the analysis and be content that the methods employed for this purpose are robust. To 
complicate that issue with regard to supply, there is an important question – especially regarding 
social care – about whether supply should be ‘removed’, especially if supply factors are beyond the 
control of the public care system. In any case, if supply effects can be separately identified in the 
analysis, then any allocation formula can either incorporate these effects or not, depending on 
whether supply is considered to be externally determined or influenced by the care system. We 
revisit this issue below. 
The third assumption is that we can find appropriate empirical measures of need in practice that are 
good indicators or proxies for the theoretical concepts of need. For example, in making decisions 
about meeting people’s need, care staff will assess the person’s level of functional impairment. We 
would therefore need datasets that contain variables that are good indicators of functional 
impairment. In practice, we can never capture every aspect of need. Rather, the assumption of the 
utilisation approach is that unbiased estimates of need effects can be obtained.  
The second method might be called the epidemiological or normative approach. In this case, need is 
determined on the basis of specific normative criteria and the measures of need populating these 
criteria are used directly to allocate resources (Asthana, Gibson 2011, Asthana, Gibson et al. 2004, 
Galbraith, Stone 2011, Vallejo-Torres, Morris et al. 2009). This approach has been described in 
health care and would involve using morbidity data to allocate health care resources. In particular, 
within disease groups, resources would be allocated geographically on the basis of the relative 
prevalence of the disease.  
There are three key assumptions in this case. The first is that a normative definition of need exists 
and is agreed nationally. In particular, this standard must be specified in a way so that it can be 
implemented in an allocation formula, including the determination of the relative weight given to 
key elements.  
The second assumption is that the need factors used in the normative criteria are measurable and 
are free from non-need influences. For example, if we use prevalence data, we have to be sure that 
diagnosis thresholds are not influenced by non-need factors, such as supply. 
Third, as with the utilisation approach, we need good-quality empirical datasets with the required 
need indicators. This can often be a particular challenge for the normative approach since it requires 
specific indicators and these are not normally part of routine, administrative datasets, e.g. 
information on disability rates. 
As regards the healthcare case, the vast majority of allocation formulae have used the utilisation 
approach. Social care formulae have also largely been determined on this basis. In theory, if each of 
the assumptions outlined above was upheld, then the two approaches would produce the same 
allocation. In practice, the assumptions are not all likely to hold, and therefore the preferred 
approach becomes a second-best choice. The main judgement is whether the needs criteria that can 
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be inferred from a utilisation analysis are more or less robust than a practical interpretation of need 
and support criteria from the normative principles underpinning social care.  
In the social care case, we argue that sufficiently specific normative principles are not available – 
there are no agreed national definitions. There is a needs-based eligibility framework that is used by 
local authorities, although this does allow significant room for interpretation by care managers and 
social workers on the ground, and for each local authority (Department of Health 2010, Department 
of Health 2014). This framework encompasses multiple aspects of ‘need’, including not only personal 
impairment but also concepts such as risks to safety (which include environmental factors) and, 
importantly, the availability of informal care. There are also financial-means-testing rules (which are 
highly specific for residential care) which apply to determine access to the publicly-funded care 
system (Department of Health 2010, Department of Health 2014).  
However, these criteria are not in a form that allows a direct synthesis of a normative allocation rule 
for the purposes of developing a resource allocation formula. A normative approach would need to 
determine weights for each of the main elements – personal impairment, safety, informal care and 
financial situation – to reflect their significance in the local population when assessing ‘overall need’ 
for an allocation formula. Particular challenges in this regard for social care are as follows. First, as 
social care is a local system, with 152 local authorities able to interpret needs-based eligibility 
criteria to some extent, any normative approach would need to synthesise and average-out a 
national set of criteria. Second, setting out specific rules for how much need can be met by informal 
care has proved to be extremely difficult and controversial in other countries. Those countries that 
have adopted an entitlement-based care system – usually a long-term care (social) insurance system 
which requires explicit criteria – have had to make the system ‘carer-blind’ to avoid this problem 
(Fernandez, Forder 2012). 
The practical limitations of the (full) normative approach are therefore significant in social care, and 
this approach was not used in this study. However, we could use the pure utilisation-based approach 
only for the revision of the Relative Needs Formulae. Regarding the Care Act reforms, the aim was to 
estimate formulae for the newly eligible people. As there are not specific utilisation data for people 
not yet receiving LA support, a pure utilisation approach was not applicable for this part of the 
analysis.  
Instead, the analysis on the cap on lifetime care costs is based on a mixed-utilisation-based 
approach. We used data on care home service utilisation by self-funders and assumed that self-
funders in care homes would pass a needs test if LA assessment criteria were applied. Given the high 
level of care need of care home residents (including self-funders), this seemed to be a reasonable 
assumption. 
For the extension to the means test we adopted a hybrid analysis that employed utilisation data and 
methods, but used (normative) prevalence-based simulation for predicting the additional 
expenditure requirement for new eligible people. 
The methods used in this study and the related assumptions are summarised in Box 1. 
1.3 Methods for existing and new local authority responsibilities  
1.3.1 Existing adult social care responsibilities  
Relative needs formulae in social care are generally determined by using data on the support that 
local authorities currently provide, and establishing (using statistical models) the relationship 
between exogenous need variables and the amount of that support. In particular, this has involved 
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using data on the current level of publicly-funded social care service utilisation by local populations 
(Darton, Forder et al. 2010).  
Individual person data including both their service use and needs-related characteristics are 
generally not available. Rather, in this analysis we used a small area approach whereby the 
relationship between per capita expenditure (or the count of service users) and per capita need is 
estimated across small areas of our sample LAs. In particular, we use the ONS standard geographical 
unit of the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA), of which there are 32,844 in England. LSOAs are 
relatively homogenous and allowed us to link in a wide range of potentially relevant need, wealth 
and supply data. 
  
Current datasets provide a range of indicators of need and different aspects of need (i.e. rates of 
Attendance Allowance uptake, rates of limiting long-standing illness in population, age, sex, living 
arrangements, etc.) as well as financial indicators (i.e. rates of Income Support or Pension Credit 
uptake, rates of home ownership, average property prices, etc.). These need and wealth factors will 
Box 1. Methods and key assumptions by allocation formula 
Methods: 
 Relative Needs Formulae revision – pure utilisation-based approach using data on LA assessed service 
use; 
 Allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care cost – mixed-utilisation-based approach, using data on 
self-assessed needs through self-funders; 
 Allocation formula for the extension to the financial means test – hybrid approach using a combination 
of utilisation data and methods, but (normative) prevalence-based simulation for predicting the 
additional expenditure requirement for new eligible people. 
Key assumptions: 
 The assessment criteria used by care commissioners are appropriate for determining social care needs. 
 Other (non-need) influences on final patterns of utilisation (e.g. supply of social care services) can be 
sufficiently accounted for in the analysis. 
 Available data include appropriate measures of need (e.g. rates of Attendance Allowance uptake, rates 
of limiting long-standing illness in population, etc.) that are good indicators for the theoretical concepts 
of need and allow the estimation of unbiased need effects. 
 Individual level characteristics of people in each small-area population (i.e. LSOA/MSOA) are similar. 
Additional assumptions: 
 Self-funders in residential and nursing care have eligible needs according to LA assessment criteria – 
Allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care cost 
 Self-funders’ average level of need at LA level is similar between all LAs, i.e. self-funders with a 
relatively higher level of need are not clustered in particular LAs – Allocation formula for the cap on 
lifetime care cost 
 Older people aged 75 and over and needing help with at least one activity of daily living (ADL) have 
eligible needs according to LA assessment criteria – Allocation formula for the extension to the financial 
means test 
 Regional average unit cost for residential and nursing care capture regional differences in economic 
activity and prices of services, but are not under the control of a particular local authority (i.e. are 
exogenous) – Allocation formula for the extension to the financial means test 
 Individuals with assets just above the a capital limit have the same behaviour and are assessed 
consistently across all LAs – Allocation formula for the extension to the financial means test 
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determine whether a person is eligible for LA-funded social care support. The problem is that both 
tests embody a combination of needs and income/wealth-related conditions. What we require is a 
way of combining these indicators into a single index of need and wealth for each LA. One way of 
doing this is to see how far these factors explain social care utilisation (service user numbers) by LAs, 
using regression analysis. A formula for a relative needs index can be estimated on this basis. 
1.3.1.1 Supply factors 
One limitation with using social care provision is that utilisation of support reflects not only current 
need and wealth levels in the population, but also current supply patterns. These effects need to be 
‘cleaned’ from the social care utilisation data because leaving them in such a formula will bias the 
results. 
In theory, supply factors can be ‘cleaned’ by including a supply variable in the analysis. With regard 
to the care homes sector, a potentially suitable indicator is the number of available beds in each 
area. The difficulty is that supply itself is likely to be affected by demand/need. For example, we 
might expect to see higher supply in areas that have high need and vice versa. As a result, the direct 
use of a supply factor such as care home beds could bias our estimates of need effects.  
We used a two-fold strategy to tackle this potential issue. First, rather than include beds for the 
small area (the LSOA), we used the larger middle-layer super output area (MSOA) which nests LSOAs. 
This aggregated supply variable should better reflect actual effects of supply, as potential providers 
look to the availability of competitors and capacity in the local market. Moreover, supply at this level 
should be less directly affected by the need level in a given LSOA. 
Second, we used an instrumental variable (IV) approach to test for this potentially interdependent 
effect (or ‘endogeneity’) between our supply variable and need. We tested both LSOA-level and 
MSOA-level supply in this way as a validity test for our assumptions about supply. 
Once supply effects are isolated, they can be removed by setting this variable to a constant for all 
LAs.  
1.3.1.2 Differences in LA social care policy 
LA fixed effects were modelled to control for any non-need effects at LA level (e.g. differences in 
commissioning practices, local area characteristics, data collection methods and quality, etc.). Once 
isolated, they were removed by using their national average values and included in the constant 
term. 
1.3.1.3 Out-of-area placements 
One of the important benefits of using existing local authority-funded service use for estimating 
relative needs is that this avoids problems of out-of-area placement. Many LAs, but particularly 
those in London, have some residents placed in care homes outside the LA boundaries. The public 
costs of care for these people generally remains the responsibility of the referring LA. We used data 
on LA-supported provision, not on what services are used within the local authorities, so precluding 
this issue. 
1.3.2 New responsibilities  
The methodological issues discussed above apply to the analysis of all allocation formulae. However, 
due to the fact that utilisation of LA support is observed only for current eligible people, for the 
analysis on the cap on lifetime care cost we had to use data on non-LA-supported people (i.e. self-
funders), while for the analysis on the extension to the means test we had to simulate a predicted 
additional expenditure requirement for newly eligible people. 
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By using data on self-funders’ care home service utilisation, we have assumed that all self-funders 
residing in care homes have eligible needs according to an LA needs-test and that the self-funders’ 
average level of need at LA level is similar between all LAs. In other words, we assume that self-
funders with a high level of need are not clustered in particular LAs. This may be plausible if we bear 
in mind that all care home residents (including self-funders) have relatively high care needs. 
In order to obtain an estimate of the amount of service utilisation by new eligible people in each 
small area due to the (new) extended means test, we first simulated both the expenditure 
requirement according to the current financial means test and the expenditure requirement 
according to the (new) extended financial means test using individual data available from the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Then, we estimated the effect of relevant need and financial indicators 
on each simulated expenditure requirement for all people with care needs. Using need and financial 
indicators at small-area level and the coefficients from the first step, we obtained in a next step for 
each small area (i.e. LSOA) a predicted expenditure requirement according to either the current or 
the new capital limits conditional on being financially eligible. Finally, by subtracting from the LSOA-
level expenditure requirement according to the (new) extended means test the LSOA-level 
expenditure requirement according to the current means test, we obtained for each small area the 
expected additional expenditure requirement for all people that would pass both a needs and the 
(new) extended means test. 
1.4 The allocation formulae 
1.4.1 The Relative Needs Formulae 
Four distinctive Relative Needs Formulae are estimated for adult social care, by two age groups (i.e. 
young adults aged 18 to 64 and older people aged 65 and over) and two types of services (i.e. 
residential/nursing care and community-based care). This allows, on the one side, a better 
specification of the relationship between utilisation patterns and need and wealth factors. On the 
other side, the distinction between care homes and community-based services had become more 
and more blurred, and the government policies gave increasing importance to helping people meet 
their care needs in their own homes for as long as possible (Bebbington 2002, Darton, Forder et al. 
2010, Department of Health 2014). For each age group, the two service type formulae are ultimately 
combined in one single formula. 
1.4.2 The allocation formulae for the Care Act reforms 
The biggest share of the new financial support to be provided due to the Care Act reforms is likely to 
be for self-funders aged 65 and over with residential care needs: the upper capital limit for people in 
residential care will greatly increase from £23,250 to £118,000, and older people who pay for their 
own social care account for about 45 to 47 per cent of residential and nursing home places (Institute 
of Public Care 2011). 
The policy change is likely to have only a marginal effect for older people receiving community-based 
care: according to existing estimates only about 20 per cent of them are self-funders; the increase of 
the upper capital limit from £23,250 to £27,000 is rather small; and the majority of older people in 
community-based care receive fewer than four hours of care per week and would most likely never 
reach the cap (Forder 2007, Institute of Public Care 2011). Furthermore, the vast majority of young 
adults with care needs are already publicly funded. 
The gain from modelling new eligible young adults and older community-based clients would be 
rather low, but would increase the risk of introducing bias in the allocation formulae. The formulae 
for the Care Act reforms are, therefore, estimated only for older people with residential care needs. 
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2 Analytical framework 
2.1.1 RNF for adult social care 
Any person who actually receives LA-funded support will have satisfied both a needs test (𝑅) and a 
financial eligibility test (𝐸). To estimate a relative needs formula, we need to use need factors to 
predict the local authority’s expenditure requirement for adult social care. For any individual in the 
local population this expenditure requirement is: 
 𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑠𝑐 = 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸) (1) 
that is, the probability of being eligible for LA-supported care (𝑝) times the unit cost of care to the LA 
(𝑢). The probability that a person in the population satisfies the needs and financial eligibility tests 
can be expressed as a function of need, wealth and supply indicators: 
 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸) = 𝑓𝑅+𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑠) (2)  
where 𝑥 denotes needs factors, 𝑦 wealth indicators, and 𝑠 supply. The analysis readily generalises to 
small-area level, if we assume that individual-level probabilities in a given small-area population are 
about the same. This assumption seems reasonable if the relevant characteristics of people in that 
population are similar. For this reason, we use as small a population level as possible for the analysis, 
namely the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) populations. In this case the number or count of 
people who are eligible and using LA-supported services is: 𝑐𝑖
𝑅+𝐸 = 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸) × 𝑚𝑖, where 𝑖 denotes 
the LSOA and 𝑚𝑖 is the population of the LSOA. 
In theory, the unit cost of care to the LA will also vary by the level of need of the individual and their 
financial situation, because individuals might pay charges to the LA for their care. As regards the 
former, in this analysis we estimate separate formulae for care homes and community-based care 
and then weight the results together to reflect differences in the unit costs of different service types. 
As regards the latter, the conventional approach to social care allocation formulae is not to directly 
include any differences between LAs in net unit costs, but rather to assume that this is a constant 
factor between areas. The rationale is that (a) using local unit cost data will also mean incorporating 
cost efficiency differences between LAs into the needs formulae and (b) this reduces the problem of 
controlling for factors (in this case relating to charging policy) that are at least partially in the control 
of LAs. More pragmatically, for the eligible people, charges are relatively small and differences 
between LAs in charges to individuals as a result of differences in income and wealth are also small 
(in particular relative to differences in eligibility). In this analysis, therefore 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸) is treated as a 
constant, and is normalised to equal 1. Any further differences between LAs in terms of eligible 
clients’ income and wealth as well as cost of services are addressed by using an Area Cost 
Adjustment and a Low Income Adjustment in the calculation of the final allocations. 
Data on 𝑐𝑖
𝑅+𝐸 were available from local authorities participating in the study – see section 3.1.1 
below.  The general method involves using regression analysis to estimate a formula predicting 
either the count of LA-supported people in each LSOA receiving care home services, or the cost-
weighted gross weekly LA-utilisation of community-based care, based on LSOA population rates of 
relevant need, wealth and supply factors. 
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𝑅+𝐸 is stands for either the count of LA-supported people in care homes or the cost-
weighted utilisation of community-based care in the LSOA 𝑖; 𝑧𝑖  are the need, wealth and supply 
variables; and 𝑚𝑖 is the population of the LSOA. The inclusion of a population size variable in an 
LSOA-level analysis is mainly to account for scale effects. Other things being equal, the numbers of 
clients in any area should be proportional to the population in that area.  
We could estimate a model in rates of service use per capita, but count models should be better able 
to deal with integer effects in small areas by having population on the right-hand side. We observe 
only integer counts of service use by LSOA in the data, rather than the underlying (continuous) 
probabilities. Consequently, in small LSOAs we might observe zero service use even if the underlying 
probability is greater than zero. Similarly, in larger LSOAs we are more likely to see positive integer 
numbers of clients. Consequently, the size of the LSOA can artificially affect the actual observed 
service use (i.e. number of clients or cost-weighted utilisation), and we need to control for this 
artefact in the analysis.  
2.1.2 Cap on lifetime care costs 
The additional expenditure requirement (AER) will arise from LAs having to make contributions to 
the care costs of people that have cumulative assessed care costs that exceed the cap. For any 
individual in the local population this is: 
 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐶) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐶) (4) 
i.e. the probability of being eligible (𝑝) times the unit costs of care (𝑢) where 𝑅 is the needs test and 
𝐶 is the condition of having total costs that exceed the £72,000 cap.  
We do not have a direct measure of this probability but we can make inferences based on the design 
of the cap policy. First, although both LA-supported people and self-funders might pass the cap, for 
the former group LAs will already be paying for most of the care costs. In other words, we can 
assume that 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐶|𝐸 = 1) = 0, where 𝐸 is the means test for LA-supported care. As a 
consequence, we need only consider self-funders, 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐶|𝐸 = 0). Second, given the cap is set at 
£72,000, the vast majority of people hitting the cap will be in care homes. For tractability, we can 
assume that the numbers of people with community-based services reaching the cap-limit is zero. 
Consequently, we need to assess the probability: 𝑝(𝑅𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐶𝐻|𝐸 = 0), where the superscript 𝐶𝐻 
means care home. As with the other allocation formulae, we used standard unit costs (to avoid 
incorporating cost-efficiency differences between LAs in needs formulae) and therefore 𝑢(𝑅𝐶𝐻 +
𝐶𝐶𝐻) is a constant, which can be normalised to equal 1. For the purposes of estimating relative 
needs formulae, the main indicator of the share of the total additional expenditure between local 
authorities is proportional to, on average, 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑅𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐶𝐻|𝐸 = 0). At a small-area level, 
this is equivalent to a count of the number of self-funders in care homes:  
 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑅𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝐶𝐻|𝐸 = 0) × 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝐹 (5) 
We can proceed by using a regression model to estimate a formula predicting the count of self-
funders in each small area based on population rates of relevant need, wealth and supply factors: 
 
𝑐𝑖









𝑆𝐹 is the count of self-funders in the small area 𝑖; 𝑧𝑖  are the need, wealth and supply 
variables; and 𝑚𝑖 is the small-area population. The inclusion of a population size variable is mainly to 
account for scale effects. 
22 
 
The count of self-funders in a small area is not directly known, however. Instead we conducted a 
survey of care homes – see section 3.1.2 – which provided information on the numbers of self-
funders per registered care home bed for a random sample of care homes.  
Using regression analysis at the care home level (for care homes 𝑗), we modelled the relationship 
between the share of self-funders per registered bed (𝑠𝑓𝑗) and various care home characteristic (𝑥𝑗), 
socio-economic characteristics of the population in the small area in which the care home was 
located (𝑦𝑖), and supply factors (𝑠𝑖). The estimated coefficients (𝛼) could then be used compute a 
predicted share of self-funders in each CQC-registered care home in England (𝑠?̂?𝑗): 
 𝑠?̂?𝑗 ≅ 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑗∈𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑗∈𝑖 (7)  
The predicted count of self-funders in each small area (the predicted 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝐹 value for Eq. (6)) was 
calculated by multiplying the predicted share of self-funders in each care home (𝑠?̂?𝑗∈𝑖) by the 
number of registered beds (𝑏𝑖) and then aggregating at small-area level: 
  ?̂?𝑖
𝑆𝐹 = ∑ (𝑠?̂?𝑗∈𝑖𝑏𝑖)
𝑖
 (8)  
It remained to run a regression model at the LSOA level to estimate coefficients for an allocation 
formula: 
2.1.3 Extended financial means test 
As mentioned above, any person who actually receives LA-funded support will have satisfied both a 
needs and a financial eligibility test; the individual’s joint probability for satisfying both tests is 
𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸). The financial support received by an individual is given by the probability of satisfying 
both the needs and financial eligibility test, 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸), multiplied by the net unit cost of care to the 
LA, 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸) (determined in Eqs. 16 to 18 below). 
As a results of the extension of the means test, the additional expenditure requirement for an 
individual is the difference between the expenditure requirement to the LA under the (new) 
extended means test with that under the old means test: 
 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑊 − 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐷 =  𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊  ) − 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷  ) (10) 
The extension of the means test will result in an increased probability of an individual being 
financially eligible. Also, because the tariff income becomes a more significant part of the charged 
amount – the difference between the upper and lower capital limits is greater than £100,000 under 
the new means test rather than less than £10,000 under the old means test – the net cost to the LA 
of an eligible person can be quite different between old and new means tests. Because of its 
significance, we do not treat in this case net unit costs (𝑢) as a constant. However, by simulating the 
joint impact of net unit costs and charges for the mean local authority, we avoid the problem of 
controlling for differences in the LA’s capacity to raise income from charges, where that is a policy 
over which LAs have some control. Moreover, we use in the analysis regional (rather than) local 
average unit costs. As the regions are much broader areas than local authorities, it is reasonable to 
assume that a particular local authority has no control over prices in a whole region. The differences 
in unit cost between regions would, therefore, rather reflect differences in economic activity and can 







𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑖  (9)  
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With data on the share of people at small-area level that are LA-supported, we have an estimate of 
the joint probability of being eligible under both the needs and the current means test: 
𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷). This can be decomposed in the probability of being in need, 𝑝(𝑅), multiplied by the 
conditional probability of satisfying the financial means test given eligible needs, 𝑝(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅): 
 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷) = 𝑝(𝑅) × 𝑝(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅) (11) 
The probability of a person satisfying both a needs test and the (new) extended means test, 
𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊), cannot be estimated from available data. We can, however, compute it by using the 
probability of being in need (𝑝(𝑅)) obtained in Eq. (11): 
 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝑝(𝑅) × 𝑝(𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊|𝑅) =
𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷)
𝑝(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅)
× 𝑝(𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊|𝑅) (12) 




[𝑝(𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊|𝑅) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊 ) − 𝑝(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅) × 𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊 )] (13) 
The share of LA-supported people at small-area level is a suitable measure of the joint probability to 
satisfy both a needs test and the current means test: 𝑝(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷).3  
While we cannot directly observe from utilisation data the number of people that satisfy the 
financial means tests only, or the individual expenditure requirement given needs – because the 
information in utilisation data is the result of both a needs and a means tests – the financial 
eligibility tests (𝐸) and the expenditure requirement (𝑢) can be simulated by approximating the rules 
for assessment and charging using individual-level survey data. As the assessment and charging rules 
are formulaic and explicit (especially for residential care), the eligibility and LA financial support of a 
person with given characteristics can be calculated, as least to a reasonable degree of 
approximation. The calculations can be done according to either the current or the new capital 
limits. 
The financial eligibility according to current upper capital limit is: 
 {
𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝐻𝑊 + 0.9 × 𝐻𝑊 × 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 < £23,250
𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝐻𝑊 + 0.9 × 𝐻𝑊 × 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 ≥ £23,250
 (14) 
while the financial eligibility according to new upper capital limits is:  
 {
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊 = 1 𝑖𝑓 {
𝐻𝑊 × (1 − 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐻𝑊 < £27,000
𝐻𝑊 × (1 − 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐻𝑊 + 0.9 × 𝐻𝑊 < £118,000
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊 = 0 𝑖𝑓 {
𝐻𝑊 × (1 − 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐻𝑊 ≥ £27,000
𝐻𝑊 × (1 − 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝐻𝑊 + 0.9 × 𝐻𝑊 ≥ £118,000
 (15) 
where 𝑁𝐻𝑊 denotes non-housing wealth, 𝐻𝑊 denotes housing wealth and 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 equals to 1 if the 
person lives alone and 0 if the person lives with a spouse, partner or a relative (i.e. son, daughter, 
etc.). Only a 0.9 share of housing wealth (𝐻𝑊) is considered, as the financial assessment allows a 10 
per cent deduction for selling expenses. 
The weekly LA net expenditure requirement for an individual (𝑢) is approximated by the gross unit 
cost for residential care (𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐶) 4 from which we subtract the individual’s weekly income (𝐼), the 
                                                          
3 Annex 1 in (Forder, Vadean 2017) provides further details. 
4 The ‘usual cost’ (or ‘standard rate’) is the maximum amount the local authority is usually prepared to pay to for care 
services to meet a certain level of eligible needs. This maximum amount varies from authority to authority, and for 
different levels and types of care. 
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tariff income (𝑇𝐼) and add the personal expenses allowance (𝑃𝐴). According to the tariff income 
rules, supported people are expected to contribute towards their care costs from their assets above 
the lower capital limit (𝐿𝐶𝐿). Housing wealth (𝐻𝑊) is considered only if there is no (eligible) 
dependent living in the property (𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 1) and with a 10 per cent discount from its market value 
for selling expenses, while non-housing wealth (𝑁𝐻𝑊) is considered at market value. 
 
𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸 ) = 𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐶 − (𝐼 + 𝑇𝐼 − 𝑃𝐴)
= 𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐶 − (𝐼 +
0.9 × 𝐻𝑊 × 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝑁𝐻𝑊 − 𝐿𝐶𝐿
250
− 𝑃𝐴) ≥ 0 
(16) 
The amount is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero, as supported persons are not 
expected to contribute from their income and savings in addition to the cost of their care package.  
Therefore, the expenditure requirement according to the current capital limits is approximated by: 
 
𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷) = 𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐶
− (𝐼 +
0.9 × 𝐻𝑊(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷) × 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝑁𝐻𝑊(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷) − £14,250
250
− £24.90) ≥ 0 
(17) 
while the expenditure requirement according to the new capital limits is: 
 
𝑢(𝑅 + 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐶
− (𝐼 +
0.9 × 𝐻𝑊(𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊) × 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝑁𝐻𝑊(𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑊) − £17,000
250
− £24.90) ≥ 0 
(18) 
noting that maximum wealth for eligible people under the old rules is £23,250, but under the new 
rules is £118,000.  
A dataset with relevant variables (i.e. level of disability, living arrangements, income, housing and 
non-housing wealth) that enabled us to most closely simulate the eligibility tests and expenditure 
requirements is the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Relevant information was not 
available in routine datasets at the local authority level and, therefore, financial eligibility and 
expenditure requirements could not be calculated directly. 
Eligibility conditions and expenditure requirements are approximated by applying the above criteria 
(i.e. Eqs 14, 15, 17 and 18) according to the characteristics of people in the ELSA dataset. The 
conditional probabilities of satisfying the financial eligibility criteria as well as the expenditure 
requirements are estimated by using a linear probability model (OLS) over a sub-sample of people 
with eligible needs (i.e. at least one ADL and aged 75 and over; chosen pragmatically after 
experimentation to include a sufficiently large sample size). We selected explanatory variables, 
including need, wealth and supply proxies, that were available in both ELSA and routine datasets so 
that the results of the estimations using the ELSA data could be approximated at small-area level 
using routine dataset variables. In particular, we used the coefficients from the ELSA estimates to 
predict the share of people in each small area (𝑖) that are financially eligible given eligible need 
according to either the current (?̂?𝑖(𝐸
𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅)) or the extended means test (?̂?𝑖(𝐸
𝑁𝐸𝑊|𝑅)),5 as well as 
the net individual expenditure requirement for each small area according to either the current 
(?̂?𝑖
𝑂𝐿𝐷) or the new capital limits (?̂?𝑖
𝑁𝐸𝑊). 
These estimated values could be substituted into Eq. (13) and multiplied by LSOA population to get 
the total AER for the small area: 
                                                          














With this measure, we can use a statistical model to determine how it is affected by relevant 
exogenous factors that are available in routine data sets, as we require. The result of this estimation 






𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑠 (20)  
where the terms in the equation are: need proxies (𝑥), wealth proxies (𝑦) and supply (𝑠), and the 
coefficients are the 𝛽s.  
3 Data 
Three datasets were used for the analysis.  
3.1.1 LA-funded social care service users survey 
The first dataset is on social care service use at Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level for the 
period 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013, which has been collected by LG Futures from 60 local 
authorities that agreed to participate in the study (Ranasinghe, Tideswell 2014). Specifically, 
anonymous, aggregated data were collected on the number of: 
 LA-supported permanent admissions to residential and nursing care of young adults aged 18 
to 64; 
 LA-supported permanent admissions to residential and nursing care of older people aged 65 
and over; 
 LA-supported community-based service users aged 18 to 64; and 
 LA-supported community-based service users aged 65 and over. 
The data on LA-supported care home clients were based on new admissions, so that needs factors 
could be applied to the pre-care address and, therefore, avoid problems of out-of-area placements. 
A number of LAs reported some problems in identifying pre-care addresses (LSOAs) and so were not 
included in the final sample. Another issue was that some LAs appeared to select clients for the 
downloaded data in a way that was inconsistent with their RAP/ASC-CAR returns. In other words, the 
LA-level total clients differed from the number reported in RAP/ASC-CAR. The inclusion of LA-level 
effects helped to deal with this latter problem, although we also ran models with some excluded LAs 
where differences were substantial. In the main, this made relatively little difference to the results.  
To explore different specifications, we estimated models with total numbers of service users. We 
also estimated models where we added the (cost-weighted) numbers of only home care and direct 
payment service users together, and disregarded other community-based service users. This made 
relatively little difference to the results of the analysis. 
After excluding LAs with incomplete and/or inconsistent data, the final sample of permanent 
admissions to residential and nursing care for both age groups included 14,003 LSOAs in 53 LAs; the 
sample of community-based service users aged 18 to 64 included 13,430 LSOAs in 50 LAs; while the 
sample of community-based service users aged 65 and over included 13,116 LSOAs in 49 LAs.  
Regarding needs, wealth and supply control variables, we put together LSOA-level data on: benefits 
uptake (e.g. Attendance Allowance, Income Support, Employment and Support Allowance, Jobseeker 
Allowance, and Pension Credit) downloaded from the Department for Work and Pensions website; 
various Census 2011 variables capturing information on people’s activities of daily life limitations, 
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home ownership, living arrangements and ethnicity; Office of National Statistics population 
estimates; Valuation Office Agency (VOA) council tax data; house prices data from the Land Registry; 
and the number of care home beds from the Care Directory statistics provided by the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC).  
3.1.2 Care home survey 
The second dataset is about care homes, and specifically: the number of self-funders, the number of 
beds and occupancy rates from care homes for older people. The data were collected in December 
2013 and January 2014 by LG Futures through an online survey. Around 1,200 care homes 
responded (Ranasinghe, Tideswell 2014). The data were matched with CQC data on the number of 
registered care home beds and Laing & Buisson data on care home type, sector, care home group, 
and date of first registration. After excluding observations with missing values for the variables of 
interest, our matched dataset includes 11,372 observations (i.e. care homes), from which we had 
information on the number of permanent residents who pay for their own care from 918 care 
homes from the survey (in 140 LAs). 
3.1.3 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
The third dataset used was the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). This dataset has a wide 
range of data about the individuals in the survey, including information about their needs-related 
characteristics and their wealth and income, including benefit uptake. Five waves of ELSA were 
combined (with financial variables inflated to be in line with the last wave). The data were 
reweighted so that the characteristics of the individuals in ELSA were in line with rates in the LSOA 
data. 
The data sources and manipulations are described in more detail in Annex A1. 
4 Empirical analysis and results 
4.1 Adult social care 
In this section we report the estimations of Eq. (3). Four distinct service utilisation models were 
estimated, by two population groups and two service types: 1) care home services for young adults 
aged 18 to 64; 2) community-based services for young adults aged 18 to 64; 3) care home services 
for older people aged 65 and over; and 4) community-based services for older people aged 65 and 
over. 
The particular set of dependent and independent variables used in the models and descriptive 
statistics is presented in Table 1. 
Due to the small number of residential and nursing care placements for young adults, we specified 
the models with a dummy dependent variable rather than a count (any admissions versus no 
admissions in the LSOA). The model was estimated by logistic regression. 
Although a third of LSOAs had zero permanent admissions to care home services for older people, 
this is likely to be a characteristic of the small size of some LSOAs (with service user counts censored 
to zero) rather than there being a different underlying process for whether an LSOA has any service 
users and the subsequent number of service users in that LSOA. As such, a count model (as opposed 
to a two-part model) is likely to be most appropriate. After experimenting, we used a negative 
binomial model. 
For community-based care – both age groups – the dependent variable was the cost-weighted gross 
weekly community-based care utilisation by LSOA. The services included were home care, day care, 
direct payments, professional support and equipment, while national average unit costs were 
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applied for weighting, as local unit cost can be influenced by differences in the commissioning 
practices of local authorities (for details see Annex A1). Less than 5 per cent of the sample LSOAs had 
zero community-based care service users for either the young adults or the older people group. 
After experimenting, a GLM model for count data (i.e. Poisson) was used in the analysis. 
Although the relationship between utilisation of social care services and need factors proved to be 
non-linear, and non-linear models more appropriate for estimating service use, formulae are 
required to be easy to interpret and apply. We, therefore, used the marginal effects (i.e. the linear 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by population group – LSOA level  
 Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Young Adults (aged 18 to 64)      
Dependent variables:      
Any permanent admissions to residential and nursing care 
for young adults in the LSOA (dummy variable) 13,074 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Cost-weighted weekly community-based care utilisation 
for young adults (£/wk per LSOA) 13,430 2,005.55 1,710.69 0.00 30,301.00 
Need 𝒙:      
Limiting (significantly) condition 16-64 per capita 16-64 13,430 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.25 
Population 16-24 per capita 16-64 13,430 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.91 
Ethnic White 16-64 per capita 16-64 13,430 0.87 0.18 0.01 1.00 
Wealth/income 𝒚:      
Income Benefits Claimants 16+a per capita 16-59 13,430 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.57 
Living arrangements: share of people in one-family 
households 13,430 0.76 0.10 0.09 0.97 
Supply, 𝒔:      
Total MSOA care home beds for young adults (18-64) per 
MSOA population 18-64 13,430 0.002 0.003 0.00 0.05 
Sparsity:      
Population (all) density 13,430 40.04 43.55 0.00 684.70 
Population/scale:      
Population aged 18 to 64 13,430 998.30 276.24 398.00 7,694.00 
      
Older People (aged 65 and over)      
Dependent variable:      
Permanent admissions to residential and nursing care for 
older people aged 65+ (count per LSOA) 13,415 1.36 1.48 0.00 8.00 
Cost-weighted weekly community-based care utilisation 
for older people aged 65+ (£/wk per LSOA) 13,071 1,892.03 1,442.96 0.00 27,001.00 
Need 𝒙:      
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 13,415 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.65 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 13,415 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.40 
Living arrangements: couples per households 65+ 13,415 0.45 0.12 0.00 0.86 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 13,415 0.94 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Wealth/income y:      
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 13,415 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.50 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band ABCDE 13,415 0.58 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band FGH 13,415 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.91 
Supply, 𝒔:      
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per 
MSOA population 65+ 13,415 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.31 
Population/scale:      
Population aged 65 and over 13,415 284.50 123.43 1.00 1,109.00 




approximation of the predicted effects of the need and wealth factors on social care utilisation) to 
compute the formulae coefficients. 
The variables included in the analysis passed several rather restrictive inclusion criteria: they are 
measured and updated routinely at small area level, have a demonstrable link with social care 
needs, and are outside the influence of local authorities. A range of explanatory variables, such as 
age groups and gender, were tested but did not prove to be statistically significant in any 
specification and so were not used. We included, however, local authority fixed effects in the 
estimations in order to control for any non-need effects at local authority level (e.g. differences in 
commissioning practices, local area characteristics, etc.). 
The estimation results, under the form of marginal effects, are given in Table 2 (for young adults) 
and Table 3 (for older people). The estimator used in each case was chosen to reflect the distribution 
of the dependent variable and whether supply indicators appeared to be endogenous, as we discuss 
below. Table 2 shows the effects of small changes in LSOA characteristics (i.e. needs, wealth, and 
supply) on a) the LSOAs probability to have new LA supported residential care service users aged 18 
to 64, and b) the weekly cost on LA supported community care for young adults aged 18 to 64 in the 
LSOA. Table 3 shows the effects of small changes in LSOA characteristics (i.e. needs, wealth, and 
supply) on a) the count of new LA supported residential care service users aged 65 and over in the 
LSOA, and b) the weekly cost on LA supported community care service users aged 65 and over in the 
LSOA. 
Table 2. Models for young adults (18-64) predicting: permanent admissions to residential and nursing care 
(Res & Nur Care) and the costs of community-based services (Comm Care) at LSOA level – marginal effects 
 Res & Nur Care Comm Care 
 IV logit (ME) GLM (ME) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 16-64 per capita 16-64 0.596*** 14,861***  
(0.158) (1,842) 
Living arrangements: share of people in one-family households -0.142*** -1,789***  
(0.0392) (243.1) 
Population 16-24 per capita 16-64 -0.161*** -2,109***  
(0.0516) (264.6) 
Ethnic White 16-64 per capita 16-64 -0.00913 -286.1**  
(0.0250) (111.2) 
Income Benefits Claimants 16+ (i.e. IS, ESA, and JSA) per capita 16-59 0.148** 1,629***  
(0.0617) (482.9) 
Supply: MSOA care home beds for young adults per MSOA pop 18-64 8.596***   
(1.594)  
Sparsity: Population (all) density -0.0002** 0.545  
(0.0001) (0.417) 
Population 18-64 (log) 0.0744*** 1,135***  
(0.0123) (96.22) 
LA fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations (LSOAs) 13,074 13,430 
Clusters (Local Authorities) 49 50 
Weak instruments – F-test (p-value) 110.42 (0.000)  
Over-identification – F-test (p-value) 0.02 (0.997)  
IV logit: bootstrapped (500 replications) standard errors in parentheses 
GLM: robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.1.1 Endogeneity of supply 
Total care home beds per capita was the variable used as a supply measure in both care home and 
community-based care estimations, where we expect a positive effect on the former and a negative 
effect on the latter. However, the utilisation of care home services and the level of supply are likely 
to be interdependent, as at the same time the supply of care home beds can be a result of local 
demand for care and the presence of care homes in an area might support the decisions of care 
commissioners to make care home placements. For this reason, rather than use number of beds at 
the LSOA level, we used for each LSOA observation the total number of beds in the corresponding 
middle-layer super-output area (MSOA).6 Moreover, we undertook some sensitivity analysis using 
instrumental variable (IV) models. The instruments used were MSOA-level need indicators (i.e. the 
MSOA population 65+ and the proportion of MSOA population that was of working age), the MSOA 
unemployment level, and a ‘spatial lag’ variable capturing the share of LA-level care home bed 
supply in the relevant population net of the LSOA’s supply level. 
Instrumental variables are used to correct for the bias that may result from the potential 
relationship between need factors and supply. They have to satisfy two important conditions: a) to 
                                                          
6 MSOAs and LSOAs are coterminous. 
Table 3. Models for older people (65+) predicting: permanent admissions to residential and nursing care 
(Res & Nur Care) and the costs of community-based services (Comm Care) at LSOA level – marginal effects 
 Res & Nur Care Comm Care 
 nbreg (ME) IV GLM (ME) 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.452*** 3,716*** 
 (0.441) (309.6) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.446*** 5,458*** 
 (0.502) (534.1) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -0.406** -759.2*** 
 (0.182) (125.7) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.815*** -365.9*** 
 (0.167) (79.86) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.923*** 2,281*** 
 (0.512) (306.4) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band ABCDE per all properties -0.510*** -712.8*** 
 (0.176) (71.30) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band FGH per all properties -1.340*** -1,598*** 
 (0.189) (120.0) 
Supply: Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per MSOA 
pop 65+ 1.026*** -4,726*** 
 (0.257) (599.4) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.924*** 1,386*** 
 (0.0293) (24.68) 
LA fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations (LSOAs) 13,415 13,071 
Clusters (Local Authorities) 50 49 
Weak instruments – F-test (p-value)  211.75 (0.000) 
Over-identification – F-test (p-value)  1.37 (0.251) 
nbreg: robust standard errors in parentheses 
IV GLM: bootstrapped (500 replications) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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be highly correlated with supply, and b) not be directly related to the utilisation of care services in 
the LSOA. 
Supply of care services to a given LSOA population is likely to be affected by the population size of 
the (wider) area (i.e. the MSOA), because a large MSOA population will attract more providers. 
Service utilisation levels in the LSOA however, will be directly affected by LSOA population, and not 
the population of the MSOA. Need in the LSOA depends on the number of people that live in the 
LSOA, not on the number of people living in the whole area. Supply, by contrast, is not localised.  
The ‘MSOA population that was of working age’ and ‘MSOA unemployment level’ are likely to 
capture labour supply effects on services in a local area, including for the social care sector. The size 
of the local labour force should, however, have no direct effect on utilisation of care, but only 
through supply of care services. Moreover, demand in only one sector (i.e. social care) and in a small 
area (i.e. the LSOA) would be not strong enough to affect the size of the labour force in a much 
larger area (i.e. the MSOA). 
The ‘spatial lag’ instrument captures the mean level of LA-level care home bed supply in the relevant 
surrounding area net of the LSOA’s supply level. As with the MSOA population variable, the rationale 
behind this instrument is that the supply of care in the local area (i.e. the MSOA) is likely to affect 
the supply in an LSOA through, for example, competition effects, but should have no direct bearing 
on LSOA-level utilisation. In particular, LSOA level utilisation is directly affected by supply in the 
LSOA, but not directly affected by the supply in neighbouring areas. If care home places were 
available in a given LSOA, it would not matter to the individual’s choice in that LSOA that supply was, 
for sake of argument, zero elsewhere since they can use services in their own LSOA. However, clearly 
the availability of places in that LSOA is affected by supply elsewhere because people in other LSOAs 
would want to use that supply.  
In Annex A2, Table 18 and Table 19, we report the estimation results for IV models compared to the 
non-IV counterparts. This analysis indicates how much difference arises by instrumenting, i.e. 
whether supply is endogenous or not.  
As theoretically expected, supply is endogenous in the estimations for community care service use 
(for both age groups), as supply of community care services can be adapted more flexibly to changes 
in demand. However, the coefficient for supply in the model for community care services for young 
adults had the wrong sign, leading to the decision to exclude supply from this model.  
Care home supply is not as easily adaptable to use/demand levels, due to the fixed cost involved. 
However, the finding that supply is endogenous in the care home model for younger adults could be 
due to the fact that care home demand for younger adults is mostly through LA commissioning. 
Therefore, both service use and supply of care home services for young adults are rather determined 
by LA social care policy and commissioning.  
We need to note, however, that controlling for endogeneity of supply had no significant effect on 
the coefficients of the other covariates included in the analysis and, therefore, no substantive effect 
on the final per capita allocations. 
4.1.2 The Relative Needs Formulae for adult social care  
The coefficients of the Relative Needs Formulae in Table 4 are derived by rescaling the marginal 
effects from the above models (Table 2 and Table 3) so that the formula predicts on average the 
weekly per capita costs for either residential of community-based care in the LSOA (with sample 
average need factors). Supply, ethnicity and population scaling effects are removed by setting them 
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at national average values and adding them to the constant term. The combined formula for each 
age group (i.e. the last column) is obtained by the summation of the respective coefficients for each 
service type. By convention the RNF are linearized, i.e. the effect is assumed to be the same at any 
value of a variable. 
Table 4. Relative Needs Formulae for adult social care 
 






Young adults aged 18 to 64  
Limiting (significantly) condition 16-64 per capita 16-64 9.20 13.51 22.71 
Living arrangements: share of people in one-family households -2.19 -1.63 -3.82 
Population 16-24 per capita 16-64 -2.49 -1.92 -4.40 
Income Benefits Claimants 16+ (i.e. IS, ESA, and JSA) per capita 
16-59 2.29 1.48 3.77 
Constant 3.04 2.55 5.58 
 
Older people aged 65 and over  
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 17.61 11.92 29.53 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 10.39 17.50 27.89 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -2.92 -2.43 -5.35 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 13.81 7.32 21.13 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties 
in council tax band ABCDE per all properties -3.66 -2.29 -5.95 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties 
in council tax band FGH per all properties -9.62 -5.13 -14.75 
Constant 9.50 5.39 14.89 
4.1.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to check the robustness of the formulae, we estimated alternative models from which we 
excluded one or more covariates not included in the 2005/2006 version of the RNF; a further model 
was estimated by jointly modelling care home and community-based services (as for the current RNF 
version). Annex A3 gives details. In the main, there was a high correlation between versions in terms 
of the per capita allocations to local authorities, with all coefficients above 0.92 (see Figure 2).7 
4.1.2.2 Comparison to 2005/06 RNF 
With a correlation coefficient of 0.91, the per capita allocations according to the new and the 
2005/06 RNF for adult social care are relatively high as well. The new RNF should, however, better 
approximate the distribution of care needs between local authorities due to a number of 
improvements to the empirical analysis: 
 using data at much smaller area level, i.e. LSOA compared to ward level in 2005/06; 
 using a higher number of observations, i.e. more than 13,000 compared to 775 in 2005/06; 
 using newer data, e.g. Census 2011 and DWP 2013 compared to the Census 2001 data used 
for developing of the current (2005/06) ASC RNF; 
 using additional covariates to capture need by taking advantage of the 2011 Census, i.e. the 
share of people with limiting (significant) conditions; 
 using additional covariates to capture the distribution of wealth, i.e. interaction terms 
between the share of home ownership and the share of properties in various council tax 
bands. 
                                                          
7 A correlation coefficient of 1.00 would indicate identical allocations between models. 
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Figure 2. Per capita allocations by local authority – sensitivity to model specification 
 
Note: Per capita allocations are based on a hypothetical budget. 
4.1.2.3 Comparison with allocations based on alternative measure of care needs 
In order to test the redistributional performance of the RNF formula, we compared the allocations 
based on the new RNF with allocations based on alternative indicators of underlying need. Figure 3 
plots allocations based on the new RNF for older people along with allocations based on prevalence 
of dementia. Due to the fact that the RNF formula does take into account also geographic variation 
in wealth/income in the local population, while prevalence of dementia does not, we should be able 
to identify a relation with deprivation rank only in the case of RNF allocations. 
Figure 3 illustrates that RNF allocations for older people are quite well related to underlying need as 
captured by prevalence of dementia (i.e. correlation coefficient of 0.60). Furthermore, and as 
expected, the RNF is allocating relatively more resources to more deprived LAs (i.e. decreasing trend 
with respect to decrease in deprivation), while allocations by prevalence of dementia seem less 
related to deprivation. 
Figure 3. Per capita allocations by local authority -  new RNF for older people vs. dementia prevalence 
 
Note: Per capita allocations are based on a hypothetical budget. LA level dementia prevalence data are from Alzheimer’s 
Society (2014), Dementia UK Update: Appendix A. 
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4.2 Cap on lifetime care costs 
4.2.1 Care-home level analysis 
The analysis for the estimation of the cap on lifetime care cost formula is performed in two stages. 
The first stage of the analysis is at care home level and has the aim of predicting the share of self-
funders per number of registered beds for each CQC registered care home for older people.  
Descriptive statistics for our sample of 919 care homes are presented in Table 5. The average share 
of self-funders in the total number of permanent care home residents for our analysed sample is 
45.4 per cent, and therefore very similar to the self-funder share estimated by previous studies. The 
Institute for Public Care (2011) estimated the proportion of people who pay for their care home 
place using CQC data on the number of registered beds, Laing & Buisson data on occupancy, CRILL 
data on publicly-funded care home placements, and PSSX1 data on NHS-supported placements and 
obtained a figure of 44.9 per cent. 
We used regression analysis to establish the relationship between the share of self-funders in the 
sampled care homes and various care home characteristics as well as socio-economic factors at 
LSOA/MSOA level – see Table 6. The predicted value for each CQC-registered care home was then 
obtained by extrapolation. The preferred model was Tobit because it restricts the predicted share in 
the (0,1) range; the OLS estimation results were, however, very similar. 
The coefficients of the estimated model had the expected signs, with care needs (i.e. rates of 
Attendance Allowance uptake) and wealth (i.e. the share of properties in council lax bands FGH) in 
the local population positively affecting the share of self-funders in residential care. On the other 
hand, measures of low income (e.g. rates of Pension Credit uptake and MSOA unemployment levels) 
and the presence of a potential informal carer in the household (i.e. the share of couple households 
in all households aged 65+) had a negative effect on the share of people self-funding their care home 
placement. In terms of care home characteristics, care homes in the voluntary sector were catering 
for a larger share of self-funders, while nursing homes and providers owning three or more care 
homes had a relatively lower share of self-funder among their residents. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics – care home level      
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share of self-funders (per registered beds) 919 0.391 0.248 0.000 1.000 
Share of self-funders (per occupancy) 919 0.454 0.270 0.000 1.000 
Sector: voluntary 11,372 0.148 0.355 0.000 1.000 
Sector: nursing 11,372 0.370 0.483 0.000 1.000 
Group size: three or more 11,372 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 
No. of MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia 
net of LSOA care home beds per capita 65+ 11,372 0.077 0.076 0.000 0.509 
Share of properties in council tax band FGH per all 
properties (LSOA) 11,372 0.115 0.165 0.000 1.000 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 
(LSOA) 11,372 0.202 0.067 0.036 0.816 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ (LSOA) 11,372 0.104 0.053 0.000 0.500 
Living arrangements: couple households per 
households 65+ (LSOA) 11,372 0.438 0.117 0.087 0.800 
Population 65+ (LSOA) 11,372 350.628 135.037 24.000 1049.000 
Share of ethnic White people aged 65+ per capita 
65+ (LSOA) 11,372 0.958 0.097 0.067 1.000 
MSOA unemployment rate  11,372 0.036 0.026 0.003 0.182 
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The predicted self-funders’ shares per care home were then used to compute an estimated number 
of self-funders at small-area level. This has been obtained by multiplying the share of self-funders in 
each care home with the registered number of care home beds and then aggregating the results at 
small-area level. We obtained in this way a valid estimated number of self-funders for 8,217 LSOAs; 
the rest (or about 24,600 LSOAs) do not have care homes located in them and, therefore no self-
funders in residential care. 
4.2.2 Small area analysis 
4.2.2.1 Accounting for excess zeros 
A challenge for modelling the count of self-funders at small-area level is that care addresses of 
residential care self-funders are clustered in areas where care homes are located (i.e. in about 25 
per cent of LSOAs). One solution is to perform the analysis at a larger area level; for example, about 
4,800 out of 6,791 MSOAs (or about 70 per cent) have care homes located in them. One argument in 
Table 6. Self-funder rate estimation at care home level   
 OLS Tobit 
Sector: voluntary 0.0726*** 0.0703*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0219) 
Sector: nursing -0.118*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0197) 
Group size: 2 or more -0.0613*** -0.0623*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0189) 
No. of MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia net of LSOA care home beds 
for old age/dementia per capita 65+ -0.198 -0.209 
 (0.133) (0.127) 
Share of properties in council tax band FGH per all properties (LSOA) 0.141* 0.144** 
 (0.0740) (0.0695) 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ (LSOA) 1.024*** 1.040*** 
 (0.228) (0.215) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ (LSOA) -2.220*** -2.247*** 
 (0.291) (0.272) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ (LSOA) -0.288*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0832) (0.0801) 
Population 65+ (log) (LSOA)  0.0432 0.0446 
 (0.0323) (0.0302) 
Share of ethnic White people aged 65+ per capita 65+ (LSOA) 0.125 0.137 
 (0.142) (0.132) 
MSOA unemployment rate  -1.369*** -1.367*** 
 (0.389) (0.372) 
LA fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Constant 0.280 0.266 
 (0.203) (0.194) 
Sigma  0.190*** 
   (0.00670) 
Observations 919 919 
Left censored observations (=0)  17 
Uncensored observations  895 
Right censored observations (=1)  7 
R-squared 0.437  
Log likelihood   188.4 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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favour of this approach would be that the market of a care home is larger than the LSOA. On the 
other hand, a problem with conducting the analysis at a larger area level is that larger areas are less 
homogenous in terms of residents’ socio-economic characteristics, which is a main assumption of 
small-area analysis. 
To balance these two concerns, we opted for an analysis at the MSOA level. The small-area dataset 
includes a total of 6,787 MSOAs in 150 LAs (i.e. without City of London and the Isles of Scilly), out of 
which 1,993 have zero self-funders. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 7. 
In order to account for the zero values areas that remained, we experimented with a number of 
models: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (i.e. a count model that models separately excessive zeros), 
and three models for censored data (i.e. Tobit, Censored Regression model, and Heckman). The 
Tobit and Heckman models assume left censoring at ‘0’, while the censored regression model 
assumes right censoring at full capacity – this is implicitly ‘0’ in MSOAs with no care home bed 
vacancies. 
We selected between these estimation options by considering their results in terms of the 
aggregated predicted values of self-funders they produced, and also by looking that their respective 
goodness-of-fit measures. Details of this analysis can be found in Table 22 of Annex A4. In summary, 
the predicted aggregated number of self-funders resulting from the Censored Regression model 
greatly underestimated the number of self-funders, while the predicted aggregated number of self-
funders according to the Heckman model greatly overestimated the number of self-funders. The 
Tobit model appeared to perform the best in this respect. It also showed good results in terms of 
residual sum squared (RSS), and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
The results of the Tobit model are presented in Table 8. The marginal effects are based on the 
expected value of the dependent variable being zero for MSOAs with no self-funders (Y*), as we 
know there are no self-funders in MSOAs with no care homes. As expected, the needs factors (i.e. 
the Attendance Allowance uptake and the share of people with significant limiting conditions) have a 
positive effect on the count of self-funders.  
Table 7. Descriptive statistics – MSOA level      
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Count of self-funders aged 65+ 6,787 21.022 27.199 0.000 360.000 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+  6,787 0.158 0.042 0.000 0.353 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 6,787 0.088 0.038 0.000 0.246 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 6,787 0.063 0.015 0.011 0.167 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 
65+ 6,787 0.435 0.096 0.048 0.721 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties 6,787 0.578 0.154 0.027 0.908 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65 over × 
properties in council tax band FGH per all properties 6,787 0.065 0.098 0.000 0.710 
Population 65+ 6,787 1333.882 494.404 48.000 4484.000 
Number of registered beds for old age/dementia per capita 
65+ 6,787 0.044 0.049 0.000 0.361 
No. of LAD care home beds for old age/dem. net of MSOA 
care home beds for old age/dem. per capita 65+ 6,787 0.042 0.010 0.008 0.081 
LAD unemployment rate 6,787 0.037 0.016 0.011 0.087 
LAD share of rural area 6,787 0.401 0.386 0.000 0.989 
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The share of people aged 65+ owning a home in a higher council tax band (i.e. FGH) had a strong 
positive effect on the count of self-funders in the MSOA, as wealthier people are more likely to be 
able to afford to fund their own care. On the other hand, the share of people with low income (i.e. 
the share of Pension Credit uptake) and the availability of potential informal carers (i.e. the share of 
households living as a couple) had a negative effect on the count of people self-funding their 
residential care. Finally, as expected, the number of beds at MSOA level has a positive effect on care 
home utilisation. 
4.2.2.2 Endogeneity of supply 
The supply of care home beds is likely to be an important determinant of the utilisation of care 
home services. However, as mentioned in the section on the empirical analysis on the RNF for adult 
social care, the utilisation of residential care services and the level of supply are likely to be 
interdependent. Moreover, unobserved needs and/or local area characteristics may affect both the 
demand for care home beds and care home location.  
To address the potential endogeneity, we undertook some sensitivity analysis using instrumental 
variable (IV) models. The instruments used were a ‘spatial lag’ variable, which captures the share of 
Table 8. Count of self-funders estimation at MSOA level   
 Tobit ME (Y*) 
No. of registered care home beds for old age/dementia per capita 65+ 434.3*** 361.2*** 
 (11.57) (9.233) 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per  capita 65+ 243.2*** 202.3*** 
 (17.21) (13.96) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per  capita 65+ -298.6*** -248.3*** 
 (22.54) (18.26) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per  capita 65+ 47.84* 39.79* 
 (24.51) (20.31) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -36.72*** -30.54*** 
 (7.004) (5.825) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax band 
ABCDE per all properties 7.987** 6.643** 
 (3.764) (3.130) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax band 
FGH per all properties 40.63*** 33.80*** 
 (5.672) (4.716) 
Population 65+ 0.0251*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Population density -0.0278* -0.0231* 
 (0.0155) (0.0129) 
LA fixed effects Yes  
   
Constant -44.10***  
  (5.470)  
sigma 15.47***  
 (0.393)  
Observations 6,787  
Left censored observations (=0) 1,993  
Uncensored observations 4,794  
Log likelihood -20,774  
Bootstrapped  standard errors in parentheses (500 replications)   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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a local authority district’s (LAD) care home bed supply in the population aged 65+ corresponding to 
the MSOA in question, net of the MSOA’s supply level and the unemployment rate at LAD level.8 The 
instrument used to identify the modelling of the excess zeros in the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial 
model as well as the selection process in the Heckman model was the ‘share of rural area at LAD 
level’. The rationale behind this instrument is that care providers are less likely to set up care homes 
in less populated areas due to lower demand and limited access to services.  
Estimation results are presented in Annex A4, Table 21. The test statistics of the Zero Inflated 
Negative Binomial model showed that the dependent variable was over-dispersed (i.e. alpha is 
significantly different from zero). Therefore, the Negative Binomial model is to be preferred over the 
Poisson regression model. Moreover, the Vuong test suggested that the additional modelling of the 
excess zero values was an improvement over the standard Negative Binomial model. 
With respect to endogeneity of supply, although the chosen instruments performed well (i.e. they 
are strong and relevant, as suggested by the weak identification and over-identification tests), the 
Wald endogeneity test revealed that care home supply was not endogenous either in the Zero 
Inflated Negative Binomial or the Tobit or the Censored Regression IV model. 
4.2.3 The allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care costs  
Table 9 gives the allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care costs. The coefficients are based on 
the marginal effects in Table 8, rescaled to per capita values. The coefficients are expressed in £s per 
week per person 65 and over.  
As it is not clear whether the supply of care home places (to self-funders) is under the control of 
local authorities, we derived two alternative formulae: (1) with a coefficient for supply; and (2) with 
the effect of supply set at the national average and included in the constant term.  
The correlation coefficient between LA per capita allocations according to the two formulae is 0.563 
and between LA total allocations 0.991. Figure 4 shows the correlation graphically. Accounting for 
supply does make some difference in allocations.  
The decision regarding which formula to apply should ideally be based on the timing of the LA 
assessment application. If self-funders apply for assessment after moving into a care home – and this 
will be the case for the majority of self-funders applying for assessment during the first year after 
implementation, and potentially even in subsequent years – the LA of their care home residence will 
become responsible for them, even if they have moved there from another LA. This decision by the 
                                                          
8 For a discussion on the instruments see section 4.1.1, pp. 29-30. 
Table 9. Allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care costs 
 (1) (2) 
 With supply 
With supply 
sterilised 
No. of registered care home beds  for old age/dementia per capita 65+ 0.2655  
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 0.1487 0.1487 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 0.0292 0.0292 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council 
tax band ABCDE per all properties 0.0049 0.0049 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council 
tax band FGH per all properties 0.0248 0.0248 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ -0.1825 -0.1825 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -0.0224 -0.0224 
Constant -0.0005 0.0113 
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self-funder will be affected by supply, and that supply is beyond the individual’s control. Since this 
supply effect would have already applied by the time of assessment, it is effectively outside the local 
authority’s control as well. The allocation formula ought to provide sufficient funding to LAs to 
support the eligible people with care need in their locality. This argument, therefore, suggests that 
supply indicators should be used in the cap formula.  
Figure 4. Per capita allocations for the cap formula by local authority 
 
Note: Per capita allocations are based on a hypothetical budget. 
4.3 Extension to the financial means test 
An allocation formula for the extended means test was estimated for people aged 65 and over with 
residential care needs. As there were no utilisation data for newly eligible people under the 
extended means test, their expenditure requirement (i.e. the LA contribution to their care costs) was 
estimated following the steps outlined in section 2.1.3, that is: first using simulation with ELSA data; 
second, applying these results at LSOA level; and third, doing an LSOA-level analysis to derive an 
allocation formula. 
4.3.1 ELSA analysis 
Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), we estimated the following: 
 the probability of the person being selected under the current (old) means test (Eq. (14)), 
 the probability of being selected under the (new) extended means test (Eq. (15)), 
 the net individual expenditure requirement applying the old capital limits (Eq. (17)), and 
 the net individual expenditure requirement applying the new capital limits (Eq. (18)). 
We used the regional average unit cost for residential and nursing care in Eqs (17) and (18). Using 
regional unit costs (rather than the national average) allows us to capture regional differences in the 
prices of services. As the regions are much broader areas than local authorities, it is reasonable to 
assume that a particular local authority has no control over prices in a whole region. The differences 
in unit cost between regions would rather reflect differences in economic activity and can be 
regarded as exogenous.9 
                                                          
9 We tried also alternative models in which we used national unit cost for the simulation of the individual 
expenditure requirements. The results, however, were not significantly different. 
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Descriptive statistics of the analysed ELSA sample are shown in Table 10. The analysed sample 
contains pooled observations from the ELSA waves 1 to 5. After restricting the analysis to persons 
with at least one ADL and aged 75 and over, the sample has 3,741 observations. For the analysed 
sample, the extended means test increases average financial eligibility from about 53 per cent to 
almost 70 per cent in the population and the average expenditure requirement from about £192 to 
£217 per person per week. 
Table 11 presents OLS estimation results for the net expenditure requirements and needs test. As 
expected, given the nature of the means test and charging rules, home values were negatively 
related to both the likelihood to satisfy the financial eligibility test and the net expenditure 
requirement. Having a low income (i.e. in receipt of Pension Credit) is associated with a significantly 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics ELSA sample (age >= 75, ADL >= 1) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial eligibility: new means test 3,741 0.696 0.460 0 1 
Financial eligibility: old means test 3,741 0.527 0.499 0 1 
Exp. requirement: new means test 3,737 216.751 190.466 0 649 
Exp. requirement: old means test 3,737 192.060 199.429 0 649 
Gender: female 3,741 0.685 0.464 0 1 
Aged 85+ 3,741 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Home owner 3,741 0.567 0.496 0 1 
Home value 3,741 117,942 150,322 0 2,540,070 
Log of home value 3,741 6.680 6.035 0 14.748 
In receipt of pension credit 3,741 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Lives alone 3,741 0.679 0.467 0 1 
Wave 2 3,741 0.195 0.397 0 1 
Wave 3 3,741 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Wave 4 3,741 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Wave 5 3,741 0.190 0.393 0 1 
Table 11. OLS estimation results ELSA sample (age >= 75, ADL >= 1) 








Probability of being 
needs eligible 
Gender: female 22.75*** 19.83*** -0.0131 
 (6.458) (6.861) (0.0155) 
Aged 85 and over -12.07** -15.28** -0.0375*** 
 (5.612) (6.042) (0.0134) 
Log home value -19.37*** -20.13*** -0.0567*** 
 (0.505) (0.547) (0.00125) 
In receipt of pension credit 53.26*** 56.25*** 0.128*** 
 (6.184) (6.441) (0.0142) 
Lives alone -136.6*** -146.7*** -0.356*** 
 (6.770) (7.071) (0.0162) 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 440.2*** 420.2*** 1.142*** 
 (7.846) (8.560) (0.0198) 
    
Observations 3,737 3,737 3,741 
R-squared 0.486 0.477 0.554 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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increased chance of being financially eligible and a greater expenditure requirement. Moreover, 
living alone reduced the probability of being financially eligible for care home services and the 
expenditure requirement, because in that case the home can normally be counted as an assessable 
asset. 
4.3.2 LSOA level analysis 
The coefficients from the three regression models above were applied at small-area level to predict 






𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅). These values would be used in Eq. (19). 
We calibrated between the ELSA and LSOA datasets by scaling the expected share of people in each 
LSOA who satisfy the old means test given eligible needs (?̂?(𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐷|𝑅)) so that the net effect of home 
ownership on the predicted probability of satisfying a need-only test (?̂?(𝑅)) is zero. The predicted 
expenditure requirement values were also rescaled so that their mean values equal the respective 
mean values in the ELSA sample. 
A further regression model was estimated at LSOA level to provide a value for 𝑝𝑖(𝑅 + 𝐸
𝑂𝐿𝐷) in Eq. 
(19). We estimated the determinants of the count of LA-supported permanent admissions by older 
people to residential and nursing care in each LSOA (i.e. people that satisfy both a needs and the old 
financial means test) in terms of need, wealth and supply. The distribution of supported people in 
LSOAs was based on new admissions, so that recent needs data could be applied to the pre-care 
address and, therefore, avoid problems of out-of-area placements. 
Together these results were fed into Eq. (19) to calculate the additional expenditure requirement at 
LSOA level from the extension of the means test: 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑡. This value is used as a dependent variable 
in a linear regression that is suitable for calculating an allocation formula – i.e. the regression of Eq. 
(20) using need, wealth, supply and (population) scaling variables. As the dependent variable is 
stochastic, the statistical error for the whole LSOA level process (the LSOA regressions) was 
estimated using bootstrapping. 
Descriptive statistics of the LSOA sample are presented in Table 12. After excluding observations with 
missing data for the variables included in the analysis, the final sample covered 13,798 LSOAs in 53 
local authorities. The figures confirm the quite substantial geographic variation in need and wealth. 
For example, the predicted additional expenditure requirement per LSOA varies between nil and £262, 
with an average of just over £47. The share of Attendance Allowance claimants varies from 0 to 65 per 
cent with an average of 15.2 per cent, while the share of households owning their home in the 
population aged 65 and over varies from 0 to 100 per cent, with an average of 65.7 per cent. Supply 
of residential care is also far from evenly distributed. At MSOA level, the number of care home beds 
varies from 0 to 309 per 1,000 people aged 65 and over, with an average of 44 beds per 1,000 people 
aged 65 and over. 
Table 13 shows the results of the GLM small-area estimation of the additional expenditure 
requirement (Eq. (20)) and corresponding marginal effects (i.e. the linear approximation). As 
intended by the policy change, people with lower and middling levels of wealth would benefit from 
the policy change: ownership of homes in the lower and middle council tax bands has a positive 
effect on the additional expenditure requirement. Ownership of homes in the upper council tax 
bands had a statistically insignificant effect (although the coefficient was negative) on the additional 
expenditure requirement: as people with higher levels of wealth will still not qualify for LA-funded 
social care support under the new policy. 
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Living as a couple had a negative effect on the additional expenditure requirements, as in this case the 
owned home is likely to be disregarded from assessed wealth. Moreover, the presence of a partner 
who can provide informal care significantly decreases the likelihood of moving into a care home. 
As expected, higher levels of need (i.e. the share of Attendance Allowance claimants and the share 
of people with significant limiting conditions) and low income (i.e. the share of Pension Credit 
claimants) significantly increased the additional expenditure requirement. 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics LSOA sample 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted value of additional LA expend. requirement per 
LSOA (£) 13,798 48.688 22.779 0 273.611 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 13,798 0.152 0.059 0 0.650 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 13,798 0.060 0.026 0 0.400 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties 13,789 0.575 0.200 0 0.980 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band FGH per all properties 13,789 0.082 0.133 0 0.907 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 13,798 0.082 0.049 0 0.500 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 
65+ 13,798 0.447 0.121 0 0.865 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 13,798 0.936 0.130 0.011 1 
Population 65+ (log) 13,798 5.540 0.495 0.693 7.011 
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per 
MSOA pop 65+ 13,798 0.044 0.047 0 0.309 
Table 13. Estimation results of the additional expenditure requirement at LSOA level 
 GLM Marg Eff 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.186*** 90.75*** 
 (0.360) (14.91) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.513*** 62.81*** 
 (0.418) (17.66) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band ABCDE per all properties 0.359** 14.92** 
 (0.140) (5.943) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band FGH per all properties -0.220 -9.152 
 (0.148) (6.053) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.338*** 55.54*** 
 (0.446) (18.89) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -1.013*** -42.08*** 
 (0.145) (6.654) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.749*** 31.08*** 
 (0.135) (5.906) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.845*** 35.10*** 
 (0.0263) (1.342) 
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per MSOA pop 65+ 0.415*** 17.23*** 
 (0.103) (4.097) 
Constant -1.944***  
 (0.270)  
Observations 13,798  
Log Likelihood -30,055  
Bootstrapped (100 replications) standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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4.3.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks 
4.3.3.1 Endogeneity of supply 
Supply is a significant factor in the modelling which supports our expectation that using utilisation 
levels alone as predictors of need will be biased. However, as supply might be endogenous, we 
undertook sensitivity analysis using instrumental variable (IV) models. The instruments used were 
MSOA-level need indicators (i.e. the MSOA population 65+ and the proportion of MSOA population 
that was of working age) and a ‘spatial lag’ variable which captures the share at LA-level of care 
home bed supply in the population 65+ corresponding to the LSOA in question net of the LSOA’s 
supply level.10  
These results are given in Annex A5, Table 23. The results of an endogeneity test suggested that the 
number of beds at MSOA level is not endogenous. The endogeneity of the supply variable at LSOA 
level, however, could not be rejected with sufficient confidence.  
4.3.3.2 Robustness checks 
Due to concerns that home ownership alone does not adequately capture the distribution of wealth 
in the ELSA-level analysis, we also ran estimations with a home value variable. The effect (i.e. 
coefficient) of this covariate was then used at LSOA level to predict the financial eligibility and the 
expenditure requirements in combination with a LSOA variable on the share of home-owner 
households aged 65 and over multiplied by the average LSOA house price. This further allowed the 
estimation of three different formulae: 1) with a coefficient for home ownership; 2) with coefficients 
for interactions between home ownership and council tax bands; and 3) with coefficients for 
interactions between home ownership and the average house price.  
Table 24 to Table 27 (Annex A6) present the ELSA-level and LSOA-level estimation results based on 
models resulting from a combination of the alternatives outlined above; the derived allocation 
formulae are shown in Table 28. Per capita allocations based on the different models are all rather 
similar, with correlations of 0.922 to 0.999. 
4.3.4 The allocation formula for the extension to the financial means test 
Table 14 gives the allocation formula for the extension to the means test. The coefficients are based 
on the marginal effects in Table 13, rescaled to per capita values. The coefficients are in £s per week 
per capita aged 65 and over. Supply effects were removed by using their national average values and 
adjusting the constant term. 
4.3.4.1 Comparison of allocations between the hybrid and a microsimulation-based approach 
A further robustness check involved comparing the allocations for the extension to the means test as 
derived using the methods in this paper (i.e. the hybrid approach) with those using an entirely 
                                                          
10 For a discussion on the instruments see section 4.1.1, pp. 29-30. 
Table 14. Allocation formula for the extension to the financial means test 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 0.4678 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 0.3238 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band ABCDE per all properties 0.0769 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax 
band FGH per all properties -0.0472 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 0.2863 




different method based on estimating average relationships between needs and utilisation across 
local authorities (i.e. the microsimulation-based approach). Full details of the latter method are 
outlined in (Fernandez, Snell 2018).  
Figure 5. Per capita allocations for the extension to the means test by local authority 
 
Note: Per capita allocations are based on a hypothetical budget. 
Figure 5 gives a comparison of the relative need shares per capita 65+ for each LA as derived using 
two variants of the microsimulation-based approach (i.e. one using ASC-FR unit cost, the second 
using PSSEX1 unit costs) and the hybrid method used in this study. Overall, dependent on whether 
ASC-FR or PSSEX1 unit costs where used in the microsimulation-based approach, we found a 
correlation of 0.45 to 0.54 between per capita allocations according to the microsimulation-based 
and the hybrid approach. The correlation between total allocations is 0.92 to 0.93,11 which gives us 
confidence that each method is properly reflecting differences in need, even though the methods 
differ in their assumptions. The allocations according to the microsimulation-based approach display 
significantly higher variation, this being (partly) due to the inclusion of LA unit costs in the modelling. 
5 Concluding points 
There are a number of alternative methodologies for estimating relative needs formulae, each with 
strengths and weaknesses. Their suitability often depends on the assumptions and principles which 
are chosen to be embodied in relative needs formulae. The utilisation-based method produces a 
relative needs formula where need is principally defined by local authority eligibility policy. This 
concept of ‘need’ differs from the actual utilisation of services, where the latter is also determined 
by demand and supply factors. The choice as to whether demand and supply factors should be in the 
final needs formula depends on assumptions as to whether or not they are within the control of 
local authorities. 
We argue, principally, that in the absence of explicit, workable criteria – that account for the 
multiple dimensions of need and financial eligibility – a more ‘normative’ approach using 
epidemiological data with such best practice criteria is not currently viable for generating allocation 
formulae in social care. The utilisation approach indicates that need dimensions include: levels of 
                                                          
11 See footnote 7. 
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people’s impairment, issues of environment and safety, the availability of informal care, as well as 
the effects of the financial means test. 
The utilisation-based approach determines need by analysing the numbers of people that meet local 
authority eligibility criteria. There are, however, arguments that the provision of social care is 
distorted relative to underling need, i.e. that people with a certain level of social care needs would 
get support in some areas, while in other areas not. We include in the analysis local authority-level 
effects to account for differences in policy between LAs. Moreover, as the equations are estimated 
over a range of (sampled) local authorities, the final formulae represent the average practice of local 
authorities with regard to meeting need. In other words, LAs with populations having on average the 
same level of observed need (i.e. functional impairment, availability of informal care support, and 
income/wealth) are allocated (per capita) the same level of resources, even if their current practice 
(and utilisation levels) differ. There may be a second order effect, whereby the contribution of 
different need factors in the formula might be slightly different if based on utilisation data reflecting 
a different eligibility policy. But, again, specifying normative policy in this area is not possible with 
sufficient precision. 
A utilisation-based approach also has to rely on certain assumptions, including statistical modelling 
assumptions, when used to generate allocation formulae. In the study, we conducted a range of 
sensitivity analyses to help understand the significance of these assumptions. In the main we found 
that the results – and the formulae that were produced – were robust to different specifications and 
assumptions. 
Overall, the statistical models performed well, in terms of statistical diagnostic testing, and also in 
producing results that were consistent with our expectations about the impact of need, supply, and 
the various means tests; in other words, the results showed good face validity. 
We used a standard utilisation approach to produce the RNF for existing adult social care 
responsibilities. For the new responsibilities – the cap on care costs and the extension of the means 
test – we used a hybrid approach that combines a utilisation approach with simulation modelling of 
relevant aspects of the criteria for the new responsibilities that LAs will take on following the Care 
Act. 
The treatment of supply is an important element of any approach to generating allocation formulae. 
For mainstream responsibilities, we argue that LAs can make choices about how best to meet need 
locally and have the power to provide services directly if independent sector supply is insufficient. 
This argument suggests that current supply indicators should not be used in the formula. The main 
approach – used in the case of the RNF for adult social care and the analysis on the extension to the 
financial means test – uses data on supply to remove short-term supply effects from the formula. 
We, however, found supply to have no substantive effect on the final per capita allocations. 
In the analysis on the cap on lifetime care cost we were, however, confronted with an alternative 
scenario. If self-funders apply for assessment only after moving into a care home, a LA with a high 
supply level of care home services (either directly or through independent providers) is likely to 
attract self-funders from other LAs and ultimately will become responsible for them when they apply 
for assessment. In this case the supply effect occurs before assessment which means it is largely 
outside the LA’s control. As the formula ought to provide sufficient funding to LAs to support the 
eligible people with care needs in their locality, this second argument suggests that supply indicators 
should be used in the cap allocation formula. We provided two alternative formulae for the cap on 
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lifetime care cost: one with a supply indicator included and one in which supply effects are removed. 
Accounting for supply did affect the allocations in this case to some extent. 
With regards to the analysis on the allocation formula for the cap on lifetime care costs, the 
weakness in determining need through the extrapolation of the count of self-funders is that we 
essentially assume that all self-funders have eligible needs, and the (unknown) average individual 
need levels are similar between LAs. An alternative approach would be one in which – after the 
implementation of the cap – LAs collect data on self-funders properly assessed as having eligible 
needs. This may not only allow a more accurate assessment of the count of self-funders, but also of 
their level of need. The approach would also be feasible in terms of timing, as LAs will face additional 
costs with newly eligible people only a couple of years after the implementation of the reform, once 
the accumulated care costs of the first assessed self-funders reach the cap. 
Estimation of allocation formulae relies on access to good quality data. As noted, it also requires that 
we make certain assumptions during the analysis. Some assumptions might be over-simplifications 
and so some error and bias is therefore possible. Nonetheless, the results of this study clearly 
support the principles of need adjustment (however that is made). Need levels (i.e. functional 
impairment, availability of informal care support, and income/wealth) differ between areas and do 
impact on the amount for care support each local authority will need to provide to meet its 
obligations. Without allowance for these differences, local authorities would have differing financial 





A1 Data sources and manipulation 
A1.1 LA-funded social care service user data 
A1.1.1 Care home service users 
Source: Aggregated data at LSOA level on the Number of Local Authority (LA) Supported Permanent 
Admissions to Residential and Nursing Care during 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2013 were collected 
by LG Futures from 60 local authorities that agreed to participate in the study (for more details see 
(Ranasinghe, Tideswell 2014) and Table 15). The data were collected for two population groups: a) 
young adults aged 18 to 64 and b) older people aged 65 and over. Data were supplied on the 
number of service users living in each LSOA before admission to the care home.  
This collection was of anonymous data. Only data on numbers of service users per LSOA were 
collected. Where there were any services users in an LSOA, numbers below 5 were masked, i.e. data 
were supplied with an ‘*’ for values between 1 and 4.  
From the 60 sampled LAs, three submitted incomplete data, while four were excluded as aggregated 
totals could not be validated when compared to national returns from the Community Care 
Statistics, Social Services Activity, England - 2012-13, Final release [NS], reported by the Health and 
Social Care Information Centre.12 The final sample included 53 Local Authorities, covering 14,003 
LSOAs. The sample characteristics were representative of all England’s LSOAs; see (Forder, Vadean 
2017), Table 6 and 7, p. 24. 
Missing values: For each type of residence, we replaced missing values for Total Primary Clients with 
the sum of values for the respective primary client types and zero values of Total Primary Clients 
with the sum of values for the respective primary client types if at least one of the latter values was 
different from zero. 
A synthetic value for the number of service users was used for LSOAs with masked values. Those “*” 
LSOAs were attached values based on the average number of service users across all the LSOAs in 
the local authority that had five service users or more. For Total Primary Clients in Residential Care 
(i.e. LA Staffed Residential Care + Independent Residential Care) and Total Primary Clients in Nursing 
Care, we replaced masked values with ‘*’ LA-level mean values, computed as: 
∗̅𝑅𝐶𝑖=
𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 − ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑖
∗  , ∀ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 ≥ 5 
where 𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 stands for National Return of Total Primary Client Types in Residential Care in 
the LA i, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 stands for Total Primary Client Types in Residential Care in LA i and LSOA j, and 
𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑖
∗  represents the total number of ‘*’ values for residential care clients in the LA i. 
The ‘*’ mean value for nursing care for LA i (∗̅𝑁𝐶𝑖) is computed as: 
∗̅𝑁𝐶𝑖=
𝑁𝑅𝑁𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 − ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝑖
∗  , ∀ 𝑁𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 ≥ 5 
                                                          
12 http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB13148/comm-care-stat-act-eng-2012-13-fin-data.zip  
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where 𝑁𝑅𝑁𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 stands for National Return of Total Primary Client Types in Nursing Care in the 
LA i, 𝑁𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 stands for Total Primary Client Types in Nursing Care in LA i and LSOA j, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝑖
∗  
represents the total number of ‘*’ values for nursing care clients in the LA i. 
In order to remove outliers from both ∗̅𝑅𝐶𝑖 and ∗̅𝑁𝐶𝑖, values smaller than the 5
th percentile weighted 
by the number of stars at LA level (i.e. 𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑖
∗  and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝑖
∗  respectively) were replaced with the 5th 
weighted percentile value. Similarly, values higher than the 95th weighted percentile were replaced 
with the 95th weighted percentile value.  
A1.1.2 Community-based service users 
Source: Data on the on the Number of Clients Registered to Receive Community Based Services 
Provided or Commissioned by the CASSR on 31 March 2013 by primary client type and components 
of service were provided at LSOA level by local authorities that agreed to participate in the study. 
The data were collected by LG Futures from 60 local authorities that agreed to participate in the 
study (for more details see (Ranasinghe, Tideswell 2014) and Table 16). The data were collected for 
two population groups: a) young adults aged 18 to 64, and b) older people aged 65 and over. One LA 
could not submit all the data required and was not used in the analysis, while data from nine further 
LAs were excluded from the analysis of the 18 to 64 group and ten from the analysis of the 65+ 
group due to apparent inconsistencies between counts of clients at LA level and RAP returns.  
As above, LAs provided masked data to the project with a “*” in place of actual count for LSOAs that 
had counts between 1 and 4. 
Missing data: Five components of service were used for the estimation of the Relative Needs 
Formulae: Home Care, Day Care, Direct Payments, Professional Support, Equipment and 
Adaptations. For each of these components, we first replaced missing values of total primary client 
types with the sum of values for the respective primary client types and zero values of total primary 
client types were replaced with the sum of values for the respective primary client types if at least 
one of the latter values was different from zero. 
LSOAs with a masked value were given a synthetic count value based on the average number of 
service users across all the LSOAs in the local authority that had five service users or more, 
computed by component as: 
∗̅𝐾𝑖=
𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐾𝑖 − ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝐾𝑖
∗  , ∀ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 ≥ 5 
where 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐾𝑖 stands for RAP Return for service component 𝐾 in the LA i, 𝐾𝑖𝑗 stands for count of 
clients for service component 𝐾 in LA i and LSOA j, and 𝑁𝐾𝑖
∗  represents the total number of ‘*’ values 
for the service component 𝐾 in the LA i. 
For each service component, star mean values (∗̅𝐾𝑖) that were out of the (0,5) range were replaced 
with the average value of the in-range values. In order to remove outliers, values smaller than the 5th 
percentile weighted by the number of stars at LA level (𝑁𝐾𝑖
∗ ) were replaced with the 5th weighted 
percentile value. Similarly, values higher than the 95th weighted percentile were replaced with the 
95th weighted percentile value. 
After replacing the masked values, the counts of community-based care service users were used to 
estimate gross weekly cost-weighted community-based care utilisation at LSOA level. As local unit 
cost can be influenced by differences in the commissioning practices of councils, national average 
unit costs were applied. The unit cost figures were taken from the Personal Social Services 
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Expenditure and Unit Costs - England, 2013-14, Final release [NS] reported by the Health and Social 
Care Information Centre.13 The cost-weighted utilisation for younger adults for each LSOA j 
(𝐺𝑊𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝1864𝑗) was calculated as: 
𝐺𝑊𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝1864𝑗 = 300 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 288 × 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 250 × 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑗  
+117 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗 + 30 × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗  
The cost-weighted utilisation for older people for each LSOA j (𝐺𝑊𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝65𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑗) was: 
𝐺𝑊𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝65𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑗 = 193 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 138 × 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 188 × 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑗  
+117 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗 + 22 × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗  
A1.2 Care Home Survey data 
Source: A care home survey was conducted by LG Futures in December 2013 and January 2014 
collecting data on the number of self-funders, the number of registered beds and occupancy. Non-
local authority residential care providers in England were contacted by email on our behalf, working 
with CQC and DH. They were invited to participate in a short online survey (Ranasinghe, Tideswell 
2014).  
Very small homes (less than 5 beds) were screened out. The dataset included a range homes for 
younger adults, older people and both groups. 
Following further theoretical analysis and consideration of the policy, we subsequently decided that 
the empirical analysis should just use data on homes for older people (younger adults are much less 
likely to be affected by the cap in theory). Due to this focus, observations for homes for younger 
adults and homes with missing values for the number of self-funders were excluded. The final 
sample for the analysis of includes about 1,200 care homes offering services to older people. 
A1.3 Population Estimates at July 2012 
Source: We used mid-2012 population estimates for Lower Layer Super Output Areas 2011 by single 
year of age and sex, as they are the closest population estimates available to the data collection on 
care home and community-based service users. The statistics are provided by the Office of National 
Statistics, Population Statistics Division.14 
Using these statistics, we computed through aggregation of single years of age and/or gender 
various population groups at LSOA 2011 level: e.g. total population, population aged 18 to 64, 
population aged 60 and over, population aged 65 and over, female population aged 65 and over, 
population aged 70 and over, and working age population (i.e. aged 16 to 64). 
A1.4 Benefits Claimants Data 
Source: We used data on counts of benefits claimants at February 2013 (i.e. Attendance Allowance, 
Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Jobseekers Allowance and Pension Credit 
claimants) provided by the Department for Work and Pensions.15 The statistics are at 2001 Lower 
Layer Super Output Area (LSOA). 
Calculation: As the analysis is performed at 2011 LSOA level, we matched 2001 to 2011 LSOAs by 
using the ‘Lower Layer Super Output Area 2001 to Lower Layer Super Output Area 2011 E+W 
                                                          
13 http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB16111  




Lookup’ provided by the UK Data Service Census Support.16 For LSOAs 2011 that resulted from a 
merge of two or more LSOAs 2001 (i.e. 145 LSOAs 2011), the count of benefits claimants was 
computed as the sum of benefits claimants from the respective LSOAs 2001. For LSOAs 2011 that 
resulted from a split of a LSOA 2001 (i.e. 881 LSOAs 2011), the count of benefits claimants was 
estimated as a share of benefits claimants from the respective LSOA 2001. The shares are based on 
the population living in a LSOA 2011 that resulted from a split divided by the sum of populations 
living in all LSOAs 2011 that resulted from that particular split. We used different population groups 
to compute the population shares for the various types of benefit claimants: 
 for Attendance Allowance claimants we used the population aged 65 and over; 
 for Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Jobseekers Allowance claimants - 
the working age population (i.e. aged 16 to 64); 
 for Pension Credit claimants - the population 60 and over. 
We could not estimate the count of benefit claimants for 146 LSOAs 2011 that resulted from a mix of 
merges and splits of LSOAs 2001. For these LSOAs, the values for the count of benefit claimants are 
set as missing. 
A1.5 Number of Care Home Beds 
Source: Data on the number of care home beds at February 2013 were extracted from the Care 
Directory statistics provided by the Care Quality Commission.17 The statistics are at care home level. 
Calculation: Before estimating the number of care home beds at LSOA 2011 level, we cleaned the 
data by dropping duplicated care homes (24 care homes),18 corrected typos in the care home postal 
codes (1 care home), corrected the entry for Local Authority Area (10 care homes) and replaced 
missing values for Service User Band (i.e. type of client) using information from carehome.co.uk (7 
care homes).  
The number of care home beds for both ‘Young Adults’ and ‘Old Age/Dementia’ clients at LSOA 2011 
level was estimated in two steps. In the first step, the number of care home beds of the care homes 
registered to serve either ‘Young Adults’ or ‘Old Age/Dementia’ clients was aggregated at postal 
code level. Then, using the November 2013 Office for National Statistics Postcode Directory Open 
Edition,19 postcodes were matched to LSOAs 2011. In the second step, the care home bed numbers 
for each age group were aggregated at LSOA 2011 level. 
The number of care home beds was used in the analysis as a measure of supply of care services.  
A1.6 Census 2011 data 
We used Census 2011 data at LSOA level for specific indicators of needs and wealth: 
 The share of people aged 16 to 64 with substantial activities of daily life limitations (i.e. day-
to-day activities limited a lot) in the Census 2011 population aged 16 to 64 – Table ID 
LC3302EW;20 
                                                          
16 http://ukbsrv-at.edina.ac.uk/html/lut_download/lut_download.html?data=lsoa01_lsoa11_ew_lu 
17 http://www.cqc.org.uk/cqcdata  
18 Double entries in the Care Home register are sometimes due to a change in management. 
19 http://ukbsrv-at.edina.ac.uk/html/pcluts_download/pcluts_download.html?data=pcluts_2013nov 
20 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/lc3302ew  
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 The share of people aged 85 and over with substantial activities of daily life limitations (i.e. 
day-to-day activities limited a lot) in the Census 2011 population aged 65 and over – Table ID 
LC3302EW; 
 The share of households with members living as a couple (i.e. married or cohabiting) aged 65 
and over in the Census 2011 households 65 and over – Table ID LC1102EW; 21 
 The share of people living in one-family households – Table ID QS112EW; 22 
 The share of homeowner households (i.e. home owned outright) aged 65 and over in the 
Census 2011 households 65 and over – Table ID LC4201EW.23 
The share of people with substantial activities of daily life limitations were used as an indicator of 
social care needs. For older people, we used the share of couples aged 65 and over in the total 
number of households 65 and over as an additional need indicator, as people living as a couple may 
help each other in times of need and access less LA care support. 
The share of people living in one-family households is used as a wealth proxy in the young adults’ 
models, while the share of homeowner households aged 65 and over in the total number 
households 65 and over is used as a measure of housing wealth in the models for older people.  
A1.7 VOA Council Tax data 
Source: Data on the dwelling stock by council tax bands were extracted from the Valuation Office 
Agency (VOA). The data give the overall number of domestic properties allocated to each of the 
eight standard Council Tax bands at Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA). 
Calculation: The dwelling stock by council tax bands for 2013 are used to calculate the share of 
dwellings in each council tax band in the total number of dwellings in a LSOA. 
A1.8 Land Registry Price Paid data 
Source: Data on the house prices were extracted from the Land Registry Price Paid Data provided by 
data.gov.uk.24 The data track the residential property sales in England and Wales that are lodged 
with the Land Registry for registration. 
Calculation: Land Registry Price Paid data for 2013 are used to calculate mean values at LSOA level.  
In order to reduce the influence of extremes, we compute a geometric mean instead of an 
arithmetic mean. As in log form the low and high values are not as extreme relative to the rest of the 
data, the data are first transformed into log values, then averaged at LSOA level and, finally, 
converted back to a linear value. 
A1.9 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) began in 2002, drawing on the sample of individuals 
aged 50 and over from the Health Survey of England (1998, 1999, 2001). ELSA collects a large 
amount of data on the individual and family circumstances and quality of life among older people. It 
explores the dynamic relationships between health and functioning, social networks and 
participation, and economic position of people during the pre-retirement period and after 
retirement. 
This dataset provides a range of sound financial variables which are not routinely available at the 
regional level, but which determine eligibility. Data from waves 1 to 5 were used to model financial 
                                                          
21 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/lc1102ew  
22 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/qs112ew  
23 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/lc4201ew  
24 http://data.gov.uk/dataset/land-registry-monthly-price-paid-data  
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eligibility and expenditure requirements, as outlined in the main text. Summary statistics of the 
variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 17.  
Data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) were made available through the UK Data 
Archive (UKDA). ELSA was developed by a team of researchers based at the National Centre for 
Social Research, University College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The data were 
collected by the National Centre for Social Research. The funding is provided by the National 
Institute of Aging in the United States, and a consortium of UK government departments co-
ordinated by the Office for National Statistics. The developers and funders of ELSA and the Archive 
do not bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented in this report. 
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Table 15. Sampled local authorities – residential and nursing care 
LA code LA name LA code LA name 
E06000055 Bedford E08000034 Kirklees 
E09000004 Bexleyb E10000017 Lancashire 
E08000025 Birminghama E06000016 Leicester 
E06000009 Blackpool E10000019 Lincolnshire 
E06000036 Bracknell Forest E08000003 Manchester 
E09000006 Bromley E09000024 Merton 
E10000002 Buckinghamshire E06000042 Milton Keynes 
E10000003 Cambridgeshire E06000024 North Somerset 
E09000007 Camden E06000048 Northumberland 
E06000049 Cheshire East E10000024 Nottinghamshire 
E06000052 Cornwall E10000025 Oxfordshire 
E06000047 County Durham E06000031 Peterborougha 
E08000026 Coventry E06000038 Reading 
E09000008 Croydonb E08000005 Rochdale 
E10000007 Derbyshire E08000028 Sandwell 
E09000009 Ealing E08000014 Sefton 
E10000011 East Sussex E08000029 Solihull 
E09000010 Enfieldb E08000013 St Helens 
E10000012 Essex E08000007 Stockport 
E10000013 Gloucestershire E10000029 Suffolk 
E09000012 Hackney E10000030 Surrey 
E09000013 Hammersmith and Fulham E09000029 Suttona 
E10000014 Hampshire E06000030 Swindon 
E09000014 Haringey E06000027 Torbay 
E06000001 Hartlepool E09000030 Tower Hamlets 
E09000017 Hillingdon E09000031 Waltham Forest 
E09000018 Hounslowb E09000033 Westminster 
E06000046 Isle of Wight E06000054 Wiltshire 
E09000020 Kensington and Chelsea E08000031 Wolverhampton 
E10000016 Kent E06000014 York 





Table 16. Sampled local authorities – community-based care 
LA code LA name LA code LA name 
E06000055 Bedford E08000034 Kirklees 
E09000004 Bexleyb,c E10000017 Lancashire 
E08000025 Birmingham E06000016 Leicester 
E06000009 Blackpool E10000019 Lincolnshire 
E06000036 Bracknell Forest E08000003 Manchester 
E09000006 Bromley E09000024 Mertonb,c 
E10000002 Buckinghamshire E06000042 Milton Keynes 
E10000003 Cambridgeshirec E06000024 North Somerset 
E09000007 Camden E06000048 Northumberland 
E06000049 Cheshire East E10000024 Nottinghamshireb,c 
E06000052 Cornwallb E10000025 Oxfordshire 
E06000047 County Durham E06000031 Peterborough 
E08000026 Coventryb,c E06000038 Reading 
E09000008 Croydonb,c E08000005 Rochdale 
E10000007 Derbyshire E08000028 Sandwell 
E09000009 Ealing E08000014 Sefton 
E10000011 East Sussex E08000029 Solihull 
E09000010 Enfieldb E08000013 St Helensc 
E10000012 Essex E08000007 Stockport 
E10000013 Gloucestershirec E10000029 Suffolk 
E09000012 Hackney E10000030 Surrey 
E09000013 Hammersmith and Fulhama E09000029 Sutton 
E10000014 Hampshire E06000030 Swindon 
E09000014 Haringey E06000027 Torbay 
E06000001 Hartlepool E09000030 Tower Hamlets 
E09000017 Hillingdon E09000031 Waltham Forestb,c 
E09000018 Hounslowb,c E09000033 Westminster 
E06000046 Isle of Wight E06000054 Wiltshire 
E09000020 Kensington and Chelsea E08000031 Wolverhampton 
E10000016 Kent E06000014 York 
Notes: a Excluded due to incomplete data submitted. b Excluded form analysis of community-based care for young adults 
due to inconsistencies between aggregated totals and national returns for clients aged 18 to 64. c Excluded form analysis of 
community-based care for older people due to inconsistencies between aggregated totals and national returns for clients 
aged 65 and over.  
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Table 17. Summary statistics (mean values) ELSA data 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Female 0.555 0.556 0.560 0.545 0.545 
Age group: 65 to 74 0.575 0.557 0.527 0.589 0.570 
Age group: 75 to 84 0.343 0.354 0.349 0.311 0.327 
Age group: 85 and over 0.082 0.089 0.124 0.100 0.104 
Owns home (outright) 0.680 0.718 0.710 0.738 0.751 
Home value (£; 2011 prices) 144,290 195,745 214,328 212,146 221,912 
Attendance Allowance claimant 0.084 0.088 0.089 0.084 0.081 
Pension Credit claimant 0.140 0.147 0.130 0.118 0.110 
Lives alone 0.359 0.360 0.360 0.335 0.324 
No. of activities of daily life limited (==0) 0.730 0.725 0.731 0.738 0.751 
No. of activities of daily life limited (==1) 0.136 0.146 0.136 0.134 0.123 
No. of activities of daily life limited (==2) 0.064 0.062 0.057 0.061 0.059 
No. of activities of daily life limited (==3) 0.033 0.030 0.036 0.030 0.028 
No. of activities of daily life limited (>=4) 0.036 0.036 0.040 0.037 0.039 
Region: North East 0.068 0.066 0.068 0.066 0.066 
Region: North West 0.131 0.131 0.119 0.121 0.114 
Region: Yorkshire and the Humber 0.107 0.108 0.113 0.107 0.104 
Region: East Midlands 0.091 0.096 0.095 0.099 0.101 
Region: West Midlands 0.112 0.109 0.109 0.112 0.114 
Region: East of England 0.115 0.118 0.124 0.123 0.128 
Region: London 0.093 0.088 0.089 0.084 0.084 
Region: South East 0.159 0.161 0.162 0.168 0.165 
Region: South West 0.123 0.123 0.122 0.121 0.123 




A2 Supply effects – adult social care 
Table 18. Care home and community-based services models for young adults aged 18 to 64 – non-endogenous and endogenous estimations 
 
LA supported permanent 
admissions to residential and 
nursing care per LSOA (binary) 
Cost-weighted weekly 
community-based care 
expenditures per LSOA 
 logit IV logit GLM IV GLM 
Limiting (significantly) condition 16-64 per capita 16-64 7.066*** 7.041*** 8.168*** 8.155*** 
 (1.723) (1.857) (1.044) (0.476) 
Living arrangements: share of people in one-family households -1.928*** -1.679*** -0.894*** -0.813*** 
 (0.458) (0.465) (0.133) (0.0977) 
Population 16-24 per capita 16-64 -2.118*** -1.902*** -1.078*** -1.005*** 
 (0.576) (0.612) (0.144) (0.125) 
Ethnic White 16-64 per capita 16-64 -0.0962 -0.108 -0.164*** -0.168*** 
 (0.236) (0.296) (0.0598) (0.0458) 
Income Benefits Claimants 16+ (i.e. IS, ESA, and JSA) per capita 16-59 1.964** 1.751** 0.798*** 0.746*** 
 (0.802) (0.730) (0.259) (0.169) 
Supply: Total MSOA care home beds for young adults (18-64) per MSOA pop 18-64 44.63*** 101.6*** 13.94*** 30.13*** 
 (9.260) (18.69) (2.391) (4.681) 
Sparsity: Population (all) density  -0.0030*** -0.0027** 0.0004 0.0005** 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Population 18-64 (log) 0.887*** 0.879*** 0.619*** 0.621*** 
 (0.142) (0.149) (0.0528) (0.0375) 
LA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.691*** -7.028*** 3.859*** 3.728*** 
 (1.140) (1.169) (0.375) (0.296) 
Observations 13,074 13,074 13,430 13,430 
Weak instruments – F-test (p-value)  110.42 (0.000)  160.38 (0.000) 
Over-identification – F-test (p-value)  0.02 (0.997)  1.28 (0.277) 
Endogeneity test: equal supply coefficients between non-IV and IV – Chi-squared (p-value)  10.21 (0.001)  12.06 (0.001) 
logit: robust standard errors in parentheses; IV: bootstrapped (500 replications) standard errors in parentheses 




Table 19. Care home and community-based services models for older people aged 65 and over – non- endogenous and endogenous estimations 
 
LA supported permanent 
admissions to residential and 
nursing care per LSOA (count) 
Cost-weighted weekly 
community-based care 
expenditures per LSOA 
 nbreg IV nbreg GLM IV GLM 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.213*** 2.162*** 1.673*** 2.271*** 
 (0.404) (0.284) (0.175) (0.188) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.305*** 1.305*** 3.628*** 3.334*** 
 (0.453) (0.407) (0.430) (0.325) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -0.367** -0.390*** -0.400*** -0.464*** 
 (0.163) (0.136) (0.0991) (0.0771) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.736*** 0.730*** -0.272*** -0.224*** 
 (0.151) (0.125) (0.0564) (0.0488) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.736*** 1.728*** 1.436*** 1.394*** 
 (0.465) (0.331) (0.251) (0.188) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax band ABCDE 
per all properties -0.460*** -0.458*** -0.481*** -0.436*** 
 (0.159) (0.0723) (0.0485) (0.0433) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in council tax band FGH per 
all properties -1.209*** -1.210*** -1.124*** -0.977*** 
 (0.171) (0.130) (0.120) (0.0732) 
Supply: Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per MSOA pop 65+ 0.926*** 1.136** -1.004*** -2.888*** 
 (0.234) (0.513) (0.124) (0.367) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.834*** 0.836*** 0.851*** 0.847*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0239) (0.0355) (0.0159) 
LA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.297*** -5.297*** 2.938*** 2.945*** 
 (0.316) (0.177) (0.176) (0.109) 
Observations 13,415 13,415 13,071 13,071 
Weak instruments – F-test (p-value)  203.33 (0.000)  211.75 (0.000) 
Over-identification – F-test (p-value)  1.01 (0.386)  1.37 (0.251) 
Endogeneity test: equal supply coefficients between non-IV and IV – Chi-squared (p-value)  0.17 (0.681)  36.32 (0.000) 
nbreg: robust standard errors in parentheses; IV: bootstrapped (500 replications) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A3 Sensitivity analysis – adult social care 
The specifications tested were: 
(a) the preferred model (above);  
(b) a model with a covariate for the share of homeowner households in the estimations for services for older people, but no interactions with council 
tax bands (i.e. ‘properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties’ and ‘properties in council tax band FGH per all properties’); 
(c) a model without controlling for the share of people with limiting (significant) conditions; 
(d) a model without the covariate for the share of ethnic White population; 
(e) a model without covariates for both the share of ethnic White population and supply; 
(f) a joint model for care home and community-based services; 
(g) a joint model for care home and community-based services, but without covariates for the share of people with limiting (significant) conditions, the 
share of ethnic White population and supply. 
Table 20 gives the correlation coefficients between simulated per capita allocations. The correlation coefficients show that the per capita allocations are 
rather similar, with most coefficients above 0.97 and all above 0.92.25 The fact that per capita allocations according to the models above are fairly similar is 
also illustrated in Figure 2, with variations from the preferred model being relatively small. 
Table 20. Correlation coefficients between per capita allocations of various model specifications 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
(a) preferred model 1.0000       
(b) no council tax interactions 0.9942 1.0000      
(c) no limiting (significantly) condition 0.9765 0.9833 1.0000     
(d) no ethnicity 0.9999 0.9945 0.9776 1.0000    
(e) no ethnicity and supply 0.9973 0.9944 0.9845 0.9980 1.0000   
(f) combined residential and community-based care estimation 0.9889 0.9736 0.9416 0.9876 0.9764 1.0000  
(g) combined estimation; no limiting condition, ethnicity and supply 0.9652 0.9804 0.9960 0.9666 0.9744 0.9262 1.0000 
  
                                                          
25 A correlation coefficient of 1.00 would indicate identical allocations between models. 
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A4 Sensitivity analysis – cap on lifetime care costs 
Table 21. Models for the count of self-funder at MSOA level with and without endogeneity correction for supply 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
 2SLS IV zinb
 zinb IV Tobit Tobit IV cnreg cnreg 
IV 
Heckman  
          
No. of registered care home beds for old age/dementia 
per capita 65+ 391.1*** 11.25*** 11.50*** 463.20*** 434.3*** 279.6*** 226.3*** 502.7***  
 (24.79) (0.726) (0.294) (27.48) (11.57) (34.74) (20.63) (25.16)  
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 133.9*** 6.757*** 5.871*** 209.70*** 243.2*** 151.3*** 221.7*** 224.1***  
 (30.28) (0.980) (0.418) (34.04) (17.21) (43.60) (17.48) (41.56)  
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ -260.4*** -11.17*** -10.97*** -294.2*** -298.6*** -328.5*** -318.3*** -325.8***  
 (18.37) (0.697) (0.633) (16.97) (22.54) (23.02) (24.32) (17.75)  
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 45.13* 1.367 3.626*** 68.99** 47.84* 36.93 -0.826 108.8***  
 (25.61) (0.902) (0.696) (28.13) (24.51) (37.81) (19.88) (33.78)  
Living arrangements: couple households per 
households 65+ -36.13*** -0.851*** -0.868*** -34.84*** -36.72*** -44.37*** -47.57*** -39.66***  
 (5.820) (0.194) (0.194) (6.134) (7.004) (7.448) (8.193) (6.446)  
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties -2.489 0.213* 0.340*** 6.063* 7.987** -4.576 1.952 11.64***  
 (3.224) (0.129) (0.105) (3.598) (3.764) (4.493) (3.201) (3.996)  
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band FGH per all properties 20.17*** 0.620*** 0.783*** 34.96*** 40.63*** 14.74* 32.58*** 45.82***  
 (6.321) (0.212) (0.179) (7.078) (5.672) (8.907) (5.360) (8.223)  
Population 65+ 0.0198*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0162*** 0.0178*** 0.0296***  
 (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008)  
Population density 0.0175 -0.0022*** -0.0029*** -0.0235* -0.0278* 0.0419** 0.0259* -0.0430***  
 (0.0117) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0135) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0142) (0.0155)  
IMR (from probit selection eq)        17.79***  
        (1.973)  
LA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -9.485** 2.033*** 1.659*** -41.76*** -44.10*** 18.19*** 3.157 -57.24***  
  (4.543) (0.246) (0.137) (6.538) (5.470) (6.678) (4.511) (8.475)  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
 
1st Stage 









Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 1.130*** -44.57*** -46.77*** 1.130***  1.130***  1.638*** 25.79*** 
 (0.0352) (2.088) (2.639) (0.0261)  (0.0352)  (0.0532) (1.142) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ -0.169*** 2.056 -1.380 -0.169***  -0.169***  -0.149*** -1.719 
 (0.0450) (2.969) (3.423) (0.0360)  (0.0450)  (0.0430) (1.409) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ -0.721*** 24.74*** 28.81*** -0.722***  -0.721***  -1.119*** -13.62*** 
 (0.0531) (3.131) (3.501) (0.0426)  (0.0531)  (0.0560) (1.640) 
Living arrangements: couple households per 
households 65+ -0.0785*** 2.664*** 2.282** -0.0785***  -0.0785***  -0.0802*** -1.526*** 
 (0.0154) (0.864) (0.948) (0.0128)  (0.0154)  (0.0155) (0.497) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties 0.0683*** -3.446*** -3.654*** 0.0684***  0.0683***  0.0931*** 1.997*** 
 (0.0081) (0.505) (0.521) (0.0067)  (0.0081)  (0.0089) (0.256) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × 
properties in council tax band FGH per all properties 0.195*** -9.111*** -9.865*** 0.195***  0.195***  0.273*** 5.256*** 
 (0.0118) (0.769) (0.977) (0.0101)  (0.0118)  (0.0151) (0.407) 




0.00134*** -2.03e-06  -2.03e-06  1.86e-06 0.0008*** 
 (1.34e-06) (0.0001) (0.0001) (1.35e-06)  (1.34e-06)  (1.92e-06) (6.01e-05) 
Population density -0.0001*** 0.0067*** 0.0060*** -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0002*** -0.0040*** 
 (3.20e-05) (0.0020) (0.0022) (2.65e-05)  (3.20e-05)  (3.65e-05) (0.0010) 
Number of registered beds for old age/dementia in the 
LAD net of registered beds in the MSOA per capita 65+ -1.214*** 37.27*** 35.85*** -1.213***  -1.214***  -1.498*** -22.29*** 
 (0.0824) (6.042) (10.80) (0.0792)  (0.0824)  (0.0935) (3.189) 
LAD unemployment rate -0.0366 -3.578 -1.990 -0.0449  -0.0366  -0.0608 2.607 
 (0.0829) (7.382) (9.859) (0.0902)  (0.0829)  (0.0969) (4.313) 
LAD share of rural area  -0.519** -0.529**      0.329*** 
  (0.208) (0.244)      (0.111) 
IMR (from probit selection eq)        0.0557***  
        (0.0049)  
LA fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0015 6.013 6.763*** -0.0009  -0.0015  -0.0837*** -3.464*** 
 (0.0190) (4.293) (1.132) (0.0153)  (0.0190)  (0.0203) (0.650) 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
          
(ln)alpha  -1.382*** -2.419*** -29.93      
  (0.0277) (0.0542) (27.95)      
lns    2.739***      
    (0.0102)      
lnv    -3.245***      
    (0.00858)      
sigma     15.47*** 19.05*** 15.78***   
      (0.393) (0.529) (0.739)   
          
Observations 6,787 6,787 6,787 6,787 6,787 6,787 6,787 4,789 6,782 
R-squared 0.723       0.710  
R-squared 1st stage equation 0.376 0.376  0.376  0.376  0.420  
Log-Likelihood  -21,654 -19,746 -8,382 -20,774 -20,799 -20,178   
Pseudo R-squared      0.0657 0.0936  0.252 
Anderson canon. corr. LM stat (underid) 262.6 262.6  262.6  231262.6.5  255.6  
p-value 0 0  0  0  0  
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat (weakiv) 115.9 115.9  115.9  115.9  130.5  
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 10% critical values 19.93 19.93  19.93  19.93  19.93  
Sagran test (overid) 1.729 1.729  1.729  1.729  2.599  
p-value 0.189 0.189  0.189  0.189  0.107  
Uncensored obs./Non-zero obs.  4,794  4,794 4,794 4,612 4,612   
Left censored obs. (=0)/ Zero obs.  1,993 1,993 1,993 1,993     
Right censored obs (=SF+(RegBeds-Occup))      2,175 2,175   
Vuong test  49.05        
p-value  0.0000        
Endogeneity test (chi-squared) 5.71 0.05  1.65  1.79  52.99  
p-value 0.017 0.818  0.199  0.181  0.000  
Robust/bootsraped standard errors in parentheses 





Table 22. Predicted number of self-funders and goodness-of-fit statistics for various models with and without endogeneity correction for supply 
 2SLS IV zinb zinb IV Tobit Tobit IV cnreg cnreg 
IV 
heckman 
Predicted number of self-funders 142,676 141,108 141,108 148,342 148,341 114,620 134,752 165,805 
Correlation between dep variable and predicted values 0.8517 0.7972 0.7972 0.8965 0.8965 0.9045 0.9199 0.8895 
Residual Sum Squared (RSS) 1,391,681 3,597,673 3,597,673 997,804 998,486 1,178,869 774,482 1,129,985 





A5 Supply effects – extension to the financial means test 
Table 23. Negative binomial count models for care home residents per LSOA – non-endogenous and endogenous estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 nbreg IV nbreg nbreg IV nbreg 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.214*** 2.143*** 1.283*** 2.097*** 
 (0.398) (0.279) (0.233) (0.275) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.269*** 1.280*** 1.871*** 1.346*** 
 (0.438) (0.389) (0.348) (0.389) 
Home-owner HHs 65+ per HHs 65+ × properties in council tax band ABCDE per all properties -0.457*** -0.455*** -0.517*** -0.458*** 
 (0.155) (0.0745) (0.137) (0.0743) 
Home-owner HHs 65+ per HHs 65+ × properties in council tax band FGH per all properties -1.212*** -1.215*** -1.349*** -1.199*** 
 (0.165) (0.133) (0.128) (0.129) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.781*** 1.776*** 1.633*** 1.701*** 
 (0.454) (0.344) (0.419) (0.344) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -0.349** -0.370** -0.471*** -0.429*** 
 (0.163) (0.144) (0.148) (0.140) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.748*** 0.740*** 0.671*** 0.741*** 
 (0.146) (0.124) (0.130) (0.123) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.838*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.834*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0222) (0.0297) (0.0223) 
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per MSOA pop 65+ 0.938*** 1.218**   
 (0.234) (0.549)   
Total LSOA care home beds for old age/dementia per LSOA pop 65+   0.886*** 0.343** 
   (0.268) (0.137) 
LA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.343*** -5.338*** -5.066*** -5.232*** 
 (0.311) (0.190) (0.263) (0.195) 
Observations 13,807 13,807 13,807 13,807 
Weak instruments – F-test (p-value)  221.16 (0.000)  198.64 (0.000) 
Over-identification – F-test (p-value)  0.89 (0.445)  0.66 (0.574) 
Endogeneity test: equal supply coefficients between non-IV and IV – Chi-squared (p-value)  18.73 (1.000)  77.81 (0.072) 
nbreg: robust standard errors in parentheses; IV: bootstrapped (500 replications) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A6 Empirical analysis and robustness – extension to the financial means test 
Table 24. Estimation results ELSA sample (national unit cost; age >= 75, ADLcount >= 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Exp Req new Exp Req old FinElig old Exp Req new Exp Req old FinElig old 
Gender: female 28.26*** 25.09*** 0.00202 23.23*** 19.84*** -0.0131 
 (6.093) (6.578) (0.0160) (5.924) (6.424) (0.0155) 
Aged 85 and over -12.23** -13.76** -0.0305** -14.45*** -16.17*** -0.0375*** 
 (5.430) (5.810) (0.0138) (5.187) (5.641) (0.0134) 
Home owner -219.8*** -233.9*** -0.675***    
 (5.836) (6.377) (0.0157)    
Log house value    -18.75*** -19.68*** -0.0567*** 
    (0.461) (0.508) (0.00125) 
In receipt of pension credit 63.41*** 65.30*** 0.142*** 57.96*** 60.27*** 0.128*** 
 (6.102) (6.492) (0.0148) (5.867) (6.254) (0.0142) 
Lives alone -139.5*** -152.9*** -0.371*** -135.1*** -147.7*** -0.356*** 
 (6.531) (6.888) (0.0169) (6.279) (6.664) (0.0162) 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 429.1*** 413.7*** 1.147*** 429.8*** 412.2*** 1.142*** 
 (7.568) (8.326) (0.0206) (7.286) (8.074) (0.0198) 
        
Observations 3,741 3,741 3,741 3,741 3,741 3,741 
R-squared 0.478 0.481 0.537 0.502 0.496 0.554 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       




Table 25. Estimation results ELSA sample (regional unit cost; age >= 75, ADLcount >= 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Exp Req new Exp Req old FinElig old Exp Req new Exp Req old FinElig old 
Gender: female 27.93*** 25.19*** 0.00202 22.75*** 19.83*** -0.0131 
 (6.573) (6.996) (0.0160) (6.458) (6.861) (0.0155) 
Aged 85 and over -9.751* -12.82** -0.0305** -12.07** -15.28** -0.0375*** 
 (5.821) (6.194) (0.0138) (5.612) (6.042) (0.0134) 
Home owner -228.3*** -239.5*** -0.675***    
 (6.362) (6.866) (0.0157)    
Log house value    -19.37*** -20.13*** -0.0567*** 
    (0.505) (0.547) (0.00125) 
In receipt of pension credit 58.62*** 61.33*** 0.142*** 53.26*** 56.25*** 0.128*** 
 (6.391) (6.690) (0.0148) (6.184) (6.441) (0.0142) 
Lives alone -141.4*** -152.1*** -0.371*** -136.6*** -146.7*** -0.356*** 
 (7.001) (7.297) (0.0169) (6.770) (7.071) (0.0162) 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 440.4*** 422.0*** 1.147*** 440.2*** 420.2*** 1.142*** 
 (8.106) (8.806) (0.0206) (7.846) (8.560) (0.0198) 
        
Observations 3,737 3,737 3,741 3,737 3,737 3,741 
R-squared 0.466 0.463 0.537 0.486 0.477 0.554 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       




Table 26. Estimation results of the additional expenditure requirement at LSOA level (national unit cost) 
 (1) ELSA home ownership (2) ELSA house value (3) ELSA house value 
 GLM Marg Eff GLM Marg Eff GLM Marg Eff 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.205*** 94.99*** 2.163*** 93.68*** 2.181*** 94.38*** 
 (0.360) (15.51) (0.371) (16.07) (0.368) (16.00) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.322*** 56.98*** 1.449*** 62.74*** 1.434*** 62.06*** 
 (0.419) (18.31) (0.428) (18.76) (0.433) (18.96) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band ABCDE per all properties 0.535*** 23.05*** 0.414*** 17.93***   
 (0.141) (6.283) (0.140) (6.227)   
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band FGH per all properties -0.213 -9.199 -0.161 -6.965   
 (0.148) (6.279) (0.150) (6.428)   
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+     2.969*** 128.5*** 
     (0.534) (22.64) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × log of average 
LSOA house price in 2013     -0.215*** -9.311*** 
     (0.0449) (1.884) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.473*** 63.48*** 1.360*** 58.89*** 1.394*** 60.30*** 
 (0.443) (19.48) (0.443) (19.58) (0.439) (19.42) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -1.121*** -48.28*** -1.095*** -47.44*** -1.081*** -46.77*** 
 (0.146) (7.046) (0.145) (7.001) (0.135) (6.580) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.773*** 33.30*** 0.730*** 31.60*** 0.782*** 33.82*** 
 (0.136) (6.189) (0.133) (6.093) (0.146) (6.662) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.836*** 36.00*** 0.842*** 36.48*** 0.848*** 36.68*** 
 (0.0268) (1.382) (0.0262) (1.404) (0.0267) (1.387) 
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dem per MSOA pop 65+ 0.424*** 18.27*** 0.403*** 17.44*** 0.397*** 17.16*** 
 (0.102) (4.195) (0.106) (4.420) (0.0984) (4.063) 
Constant -1.933***  -1.861***  -1.952***  
 (0.269)  (0.274)  (0.276)  
Observations 13,805 13,805 13,798 13,798 13,798 13,798 
Log Likelihood -30,581  -31,194  -29,095  
Bootstrapped (100 replications) standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 27. Estimation results of the additional expenditure requirement at LSOA level (regional unit cost) 
 (4) ELSA home ownership (5) ELSA house value (6) ELSA house value 
 GLM Marg Eff GLM Marg Eff GLM Marg Eff 
Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 2.223*** 91.86*** 2.186*** 90.75*** 2.202*** 91.35*** 
 (0.360) (14.88) (0.360) (14.91) (0.380) (15.85) 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 1.401*** 57.90*** 1.513*** 62.81*** 1.501*** 62.28*** 
 (0.419) (17.59) (0.418) (17.66) (0.445) (18.62) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band ABCDE per all properties 0.450*** 18.58*** 0.359** 14.92**   
 (0.141) (6.010) (0.140) (5.943)   
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band FGH per all properties -0.291* -12.01** -0.220 -9.152   
 (0.148) (6.027) (0.148) (6.053)   
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+     2.940*** 121.9*** 
     (0.531) (21.62) 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × log of average 
LSOA house price in 2013     -0.217*** -9.016*** 
     (0.0447) (1.800) 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 1.439*** 59.47*** 1.338*** 55.54*** 1.368*** 56.76*** 
 (0.443) (18.68) (0.446) (18.89) (0.434) (18.44) 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -1.034*** -42.73*** -1.013*** -42.08*** -0.999*** -41.45*** 
 (0.146) (6.653) (0.145) (6.654) (0.134) (6.169) 
Ethnic White population 65+ per capita 65+ 0.789*** 32.61*** 0.749*** 31.08*** 0.799*** 33.14*** 
 (0.136) (5.956) (0.135) (5.906) (0.146) (6.381) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.840*** 34.70*** 0.845*** 35.10*** 0.851*** 35.30*** 
 (0.0268) (1.327) (0.0263) (1.342) (0.0266) (1.339) 
Total MSOA care home beds for old age/dem per MSOA pop 65+ 0.434*** 17.94*** 0.415*** 17.23*** 0.408*** 16.94*** 
 (0.102) (4.044) (0.103) (4.097) (0.102) (4.052) 
Constant -1.999***  -1.944***  -2.033***  
 (0.268)  (0.270)  (0.277)  
Observations 13,805  13,798  13,798  
Log Likelihood -29,138   -30,055   -27,837  
Bootstrapped (100 replications) standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 28. Allocation formulae for the extension to the financial means test 
 national unit cost regional unit cost 














Attendance Allowance claimants 65+ per capita 65+ 0.4898 0.4829 0.4865 0.4736 0.4678 0.4709 
Limiting (significantly) condition 85+ per capita 65+ 0.2938 0.3234 0.3199 0.2985 0.3238 0.3210 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band ABCDE per all properties 0.1189 0.0924  0.0958 0.0769  
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × properties in 
council tax band FGH per all properties -0.0474 -0.0359  -0.0619 -0.0472  
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+   0.6622   0.6286 
Home-owner households 65+ per households 65+ × log of average 
LSOA house price in 2013   -0.0480   -0.0465 
Pension Credit Claimants 80+ per capita 65+ 0.3273 0.3036 0.3108 0.3067 0.2863 0.2926 
Living arrangements: couple households per households 65+ -0.2489 -0.2445 -0.2411 -0.2203 -0.2169 -0.2137 
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